10.3 The crucial framework. Art and technology in the 21st century

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Art changes with technology. Radical changes in technology lead to radical changes in art. Technology changes the way social relationships are formed and presented; among them, art as a privileged representation developed by man and society. That is the inevitable conclusion of a note by K. Marx in Chapter 15 of Das Kapital, "Machinery and large-scale industry". In that note, Marx observes that "technology reveals the active behaviour of man with respect to nature, the process of immediate production of his existence and with this, also, his life-long social relationships and the intellectual representations that arise from them." In other words, from this fragment of K. Marx it can be concluded that changes in technology change social relationships and the representations that arise from them, among which are culture and the Arts. In these early years of the 21st century, one of the most profound technological changes in the history of mankind is taking place, and probably the most profound: we are on the verge of creating an artificial intelligence capable of exceeding human intelligence and of turning man into a secondary or insignificant element of what happens on Earth. Changes in art, in theory, will be of equal magnitude.

It is to be expected that these changes will be of even greater magnitude if we take into account that there are other factors that are already leading art towards this new configuration, irrespective of the technological changes that are taking place at the same time. A single phenomenon is not usually the only thing responsible for a profound change, although it can be a determining factor. The new configuration I am referring to is the negation of art, the end of art as we know it, the emergence of a new statute for art.

Art has not always existed as it has been known after the 16th century and especially from the last four decades of the nineteenth century onwards, when it was born into the modern age that we know and move in; we talk about art as it became known after the period framed by the years 1863 (Manet, Déjeuner sur lherbe and Olympia) and 1872 (Monet, Impression soleil levant). The fact that in the course of human history, art has not always existed as we know it today implies that there is nothing to indicate that it will continue to exist in the same way for long after this second decade of the 21st century, to give a stricter temporal reference point. The hundred and fifty years covered by that interval constitute in fact the typical duration of an idea in the field of philosophical thought to which the aesthetics born in the nineteenth century belongs; many did not even reach that limit. This can be eloquently demonstrated with K. Marx and S. Freud, not all of their contributions survived that length of time unscathed. Without fully entering the field of current technological innovations, the paradigm of art as we know it today, now in check, is made up of three clear principles: recognized and celebrated authorship; questioning the very idea of art and society; continuous renewal of formal principles and accepted contents. Let us first address the second principle: art as a questioning of society and of art itself, which I am particularly interested in here. In the mid-nineteenth century, art conquered what later became known as autonomy, a result not very far in time from the fundamental distinctions and separations proposed by the Enlightenment for modern Western society: separating the Church and the State, the Church and science, the Church and art, morality and art, morality and science, the State and art, the State and science, and between the different combinations of those terms. The artist no longer needed to serve the Church and the aristocracy, no longer needed to paint or sculpt what interested others, he could develop whatever form of art that he chose, his art exactly how he wished to conceive it. The Enlightenment offered the artist freedom in ideas and practices of art, while a wider and more active market offered him an economic freedom that few had known before. The Church, the aristocracy, the State, even the bourgeoisie no longer defined the subject matter. No more portraits of saints, kings, and military feats. The end of Obligatory Homage, defending causes...
or perspectives that were not those of the artist. To understand the concept of modernity we also have to take into account how the artist, the poet, the critic, the intellectual rejects Modernity in itself, the characteristics of modern life. Among them, a hectic city (which inspires Baudelaire’s Spleen), filthy and unfriendly; a little-enlightened bourgeoisie; a way of relating to the world that appears as the embryo that would grow exponentially during the following century, until we reach the current consecration of consumerism and the distortion of the effects of world and speech driven by the badly-named "social networks ". It is possible that the art of those first moments of the Modern Age did not rise directly against society, but it did decisively turn its back on it. Among the many examples are the most important names of the time: Monet and Manet, as well as Cézanne, Van Gogh or Gauguin, in a trend that intensifies as the century approaches its symbolic end and we symbolically enter the next. Turning its back on society, still without directly attacking its representations and values (something that would be done from the beginning of the twentieth century by Picasso, Malevitch, the German Expressionists and others) does not yet mean the end of art or its dissolution (Auflösung), as Hegel suggested. The old-style art might be dissolving; nevertheless, the art of those few last years of the nineteenth century was in the hands of an artist who considered being a prisoner of content and of a predetermined mode of representation a thing of the past, who used his idea of art and his art practice as an instrument that he could employ freely, in accordance with a subjectivity with much broader horizons.

Art and culture

The notion of culture that cultural policy would apply throughout the twentieth century and that it continues to insist on applying in these early years of the 21st century arises during the same period in which the modern age begins in art. The emblematic work of this notion of culture was Primitive Culture by E. B. Tylor, published in 1871, whose description of culture has not ceased to glide on the spirit of cultural managers and culture ideologues of all tendencies: "understood in its broadest ethnographic sense, [culture] is the complex that includes knowledge, beliefs, art, morals, laws, customs and any other practice and habit acquired by man in his capacity as a member of society." This description, if not a definition of culture (notion that Tylor equates with that of civilization, something far from inoffensive to the German mentality of the time) clearly integrates art into the field of culture as a product of man in his condition as a member of Society. The thing is, just at that moment, the artist began to abandon his status as a member of that society and of “his” society to move into another territory, an autonomous territory from which he not only affirmed his independence from society, but declared war against it, bringing with him this new notion of art. The "épater le bourgeois" is no more than an external and superficial sign of a much deeper attitude, whose aim was to shake the foundations of the notions of art and society. On the contrary to that which occurs with culture, whose principle or raison d’être is to bring the individual closer to society until they merge as one, so that to protect and comfort society is to protect and comfort the individual and vice versa, the energy of this new notion of art stems from the separation of society and the individual (and the artist is the individual par excellence, ideally the only possible individual). While culture welcomes the individual, art destabilizes and rejects him. The notion of culture as a powerful instrument of integration (which is how it works in the primitive society studied by Tylor) will be of special interest to the Modern State, which arose almost at that same moment: Italy was born as a unified kingdom in that same year 1871, the year in which Germany also became unified. The state that “wants to be always One” is interested in a culture that integrates all vectors and all values, among them, art. For all of the State and cultural ideologues, often the same person, it is it is a good idea for art to also join that complex and for them to function in unison. Tyler did not see art as the object of self-study proposed by the sensibility of the time, anchored in the artist, and therefore did not see that art had already changed when his book was published. The State and cultural ideologues also had no knowledge or interest in that fact, they were focused on the Culture that had already happened in the past, a mistake made in an increasingly conscious manner and with increasingly tragic consequences for both the immediate and the long-term future. A state obsessed, for reasons of survival, with the delimitation of its physical and identity boundaries based on the game of Us versus Them and that wants to ignore at all costs the eloquent warning of Claudio Magris that frontiers always collect their tributes in blood, could only be interested in an integrated art, something that art no longer was and would cease to be more and more. Art had ceased to depend on external institutions. At that time other

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institutions were emerging that had the potential to dominate art, and at the same time, paradoxically, gave it more leeway: Christie’s Auction house, founded in 1766, which would become a pillar of the London-based international art trade after the French Revolution of 1789, or its rival Sotheby’s, existing since 1744 and which adopted its current business model in 1804. These institutions, in other words, the market, were those that allowed art to declare its conceptual and economic independence from society, a society which had ceased to be an object of praise to become an object of confrontation and, on occasion, of repudiation and contempt.

From that moment on, the notion of art that would dominate the entire twentieth century began to gain strength: the search for new formats, new media and new content; contestation, liberation, innovation, original invention; broadening the horizons of free and independent beings, able to think for themselves (a characteristic that is not alien to the Lutheran movement of centuries earlier). In a broader sense, this period has lasted for the last one hundred and fifty years; strictly speaking, however, the golden age of that trend had a much shorter life: from 1911 to 1921, Malevitch (with his Black Square) and Duchamp (Bicycle wheel, Fountain, Why Not Sneeze Rose Sélavy?) proposed what can now be described as the unsurpassable horizon of contemporary art, paraphrasing the observation of J.-P. Sartre on the Marxism of his times. This horizon covers almost all of today’s art worth mentioning, avant-garde art; there are few new forms, like performance for example, that can be incorporated into this framework in order to modify it in some way and thus go more deeply into it along the same lines. A framework widely ignored by the cultural policy of state anchorage, which sought to speak about art, for art and in the name of art, intending for art to continue to have the same aspirations and functions as culture.

The dissolution of contestatory art

Leaving aside the attempts to subject art to the will of the State or the party manifested in communist Russia, fascist Italy, Nazi Germany and the communist China of Mao in 1949 (and consistently in many other places), from the end of the nineteen fifties a systemic reaction began to be felt, whose objective was to reincorporate art into culture, especially with the Cuban revolution and, later, with the left-wing movements marked by moments such as the ascension to power of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela in 1999 and of Lula in Brazil from 2003 onwards. Different doctrines sought to re-rail art along the path of culture. Often due to historical ignorance and at times intentionally, doctrines like that of resuscitated national identity or, more recently, the defence of a cultural diversity that only with difficulty can be distinguished from the notion of a complex of particular and particularized identities, or the defence of the politically correct, sought to bring art once more to the path of culture. From then until now, the death-knell of art as it has been known by mankind since the second half of the nineteenth century can be heard loud and clear.

This new cycle of domesticated or newly-domesticable art (and, therefore, an art that is skidding out of control towards culture) provides right now, in the second semester of 2017, many examples of its strength. If in the past, the works of Ezra Pound, Céline or Jorge Luis Borges were underrated, resorting to the more or less accentuated drift of these authors to the right (tragically compensating for what was done to Eisenstein, who during his productions had to put up with the presence of commissioners designated as “resident inspectors” to avoid possible formalist deviations of the filmmaker in films such as Alexander Nevsky and Battleship Potemkin to guarantee a befitting portrayal of Stalin), the recent demonstrations against filmmakers such as Roman Polanski and Louis C.K. plainly aim to erase their works (just as the actor Kevin Spacey has literally been erased from his scenes in the new Ridley Scott film, All the Money in the World, which will be released in December of this year 2017; a movement analogous to the elimination in photographs of the high Soviet leadership of those hostile to the regime fallen into disgrace). The defence of the showing of Polanski’s films at the Paris Cinemathèque in November 2017 given by the new French Minister of Culture, an intellectual with an outstanding history heading the prestigious publishing company Actes Sud, and by the film director Costa-Gravels, president of the Cinemathèque and with an impeccable past to the left of the political spectrum, did not have much effect. Although neither of these two film makers, Polanski and Louis C.K., are authors of contestatory works that fit into the paradigm of art against society (perhaps with the exception of Polanski at
the beginning of his career, with films like Knife in the Water), the warning signs are there: works of art that in some way, even if it is the forced identification of the creator with his work, appear as opposed to cultural projects such as those involving identity, diversity, gender and the like, have their days numbered, at least temporarily. In the case of Brazil, the situation can be illustrated by several examples of radical intolerance against works of art considered "dangerous" because they present "heterodox" sexual preferences or because their content can be interpreted as an insult to some religion; works exhibited in museums that, otherwise, are not in the least revolutionary. Nonetheless, it is obvious that the problem is far from affecting only underdeveloped countries.

Now everything is computable

The period of art being rerouted along the path of culture from the end of the twentieth century, at least in certain regions of the world (but, again, not only in these), coincides with the new cultural reality proposed (and already in the implementation stage) by new technological means, represented by the panoply of possibilities of computer resources: augmented reality, virtual reality, artificial intelligence, algorithms, robots and soon (as we are led to believe) androids and replicants like those that appear in Blade Runner 2049. Several central ideas are hidden behind the cyber revolution. One of them is that of programmability as a general principle: everything that can be represented is computable because it is programmable. Another idea is that both intelligence and consciousness are a question of information; therefore, information and conscience are the same, they can be represented and, are therefore, computable and programmable, with which the distinction between brain and spirit, only inherent to human beings, disappears from the map (or the aim is to erase it). The notion of intelligence as a result of interaction with the world, the historical sphere of the modern artist, gives ground to the concept of intelligence as programming and, therefore, to the notion of art as programming; a programming capable of programming itself independently of human beings thanks to exponential automation. There are more and more examples of computer programmes capable of analysing, with no human intervention, imminent seismic movements and of sending warnings of the dangers ahead; programmes capable of buying and selling assets in stock markets around the world with no human intervention, analysis or decision-making; programmes capable of writing economic reports on their own or even art reviews and government programmes. It is not surprising that computers can write government programmes, given how puerile and insipid they are throughout the entire ideological spectrum. As far as art criticism is concerned, a field in which a handful of preconceived ideas suffices to describe an exhibition, they easily fit into an algorithm, especially at a time when criticism (of art, of music, of literature) loses more and more space in the more "elitist" publications, using the preferred term of the populist left- and right-wing. A teacher at the French INSEAD tells how he developed an algorithm that allowed him to publish, with no human intervention, thousands of books for sale on the Internet, indistinguishable from those that are the fruit of human intelligence, or what is left of it: it is true that most current literature, especially best sellers, is an example of non-mathematical algorithms that combine the same set of elements or actants always in action. Similarly, but much more strikingly, the authority to sentence defendants of crimes in the USA is entrusted to algorithms whose composition is kept secret by the companies that develop them, stripping the accused of his traditional right to be tried by his peers and ultimately by a judge who, being also human, is also his equal. This does not cause shock, surprise or indignation even in the American Supreme Court, which considers this resource as normal nowadays.

An art of algorithms

In the specific field of visual arts, formerly known as plastic arts, the emerging scene is already well-visible. Two works and two artists eloquently summarize the available alternatives. The Irishman Ruairi Glynn obtained international recognition with his work or “work” Fearful Symmetry, a fearsome symmetry, in which one sees, inside a dark room, an object in the form of a tetrahedron and with light inside it that seems to slide autonomously through the space located over the heads of the spectators, mimicking their movements: if the
spectator moves in one direction, the luminous object accompanies him; if he runs, the object runs after him; if that spectator stops and another approaches, the object leaves the first and follows the second; if a movement is made towards the object, it moves back; if the spectators do not move, the object remains motionless, bowing from one side to the other in front of the spectator, as dogs usually do with their heads when they are intrigued by something that is happening in front of them. The modus operandi of this ingenuity is extremely simple, and I will not describe it here, it is preferable to point out that the anthropomorphic tendency of the human being immediately identifies a will and a soul in the object whose functioning is not understood but is captivating. Another well-known artist is the Australian Jon McCormack, with his work or “work” Eden, an interactive electronic “ecosystem” where a “world” visible in vertically arranged and interconnected fabrics appears populated by small empty circles (or cells) whose behaviour is based on Darwin’s evolutionary principles: cells devour other cells, mate and generate new cells, “get thinner” in periods of scarcity and fatter in times of abundance; this scarcity and abundance is determined by the number of visitors in the room: the fewer visitors, the less food available; the more visitors, the more food for the cells. Detail: If there are no human visitors in the room or if visitors move away from the canvas, the cells emit different sounds to attract viewers, interested to see what is happening, and the return of viewers provides food for the cells. Second detail: The work or “work” was elaborated following genetic algorithms, whose effects neither had nor could have been foreseen by the author or “author” of the work, a human author who gave rise to everything but does not control that everything. The noises emitted by the cells, their movement, their gathering together are possibilities originally written into the programme but with unpredictable outcomes that the author or “author” himself does not know and that surprise him, removing the intentionality of human creation from the scene, at least in part.

In those two works, and in others of the same genre, there is no trace of rejection or criticism of society or the prior or existing non-electronic traditional art. On the contrary, there is even a quiet adhesion to the parameters and proposals of the new technological society that is becoming established. The relationship between art and society throughout the Renaissance and the Baroque periods seems to have been similar. The Baroque opera was the perfect marriage between the art of the moment, the technology of the moment and the society of the moment. A Handel opera appeared to be as comfortable in its technological age as a Renaissance play put on in the Palladio Theatre in Vincenza, with its trompe-l’œil onstage scenery, an obvious toy, a divertissement in itself, a technological toy, a game as that seems as charming as the lit-up tetrahedron of Fearful Symmetry seems today. In the new digital art (or digital “art”) there is no rejection or aversion to society or contemporary times of society nor is prior art rejected, it is simply ignored: the new art or “art” (never was the term Techné so appropriate) belongs to another dimension, another world, another universe. Where there are elements of criticism of this society constructed using new technological resources, in a way analogous to the society that marked the last few years of the nineteenth century and the first of the twentieth, is in the world of cinema, where films like Blade Runner 2049 would not exist without the new digital programmes, although both in that case and in others there is much less sophistication and complexity than in Eden by Jon McCormack. This does not rule out the possibility of cinema being or becoming the new form of artistic expression of the 21st century, going deeper into a trend that already characterized this during the twentieth century. It is not just because cinema is the new art of the masses, just like the opera was in its time and the cathedrals in a previous age: there are internal, intrinsic, formal, aesthetic reasons for this to be so. In his lecture Behind the Times: The Decline and Fall of the 20th Century Avant-Gardes, Eric Hobsbawn drew attention to the fact that all the innovations, revolutions and aspirations that art dreamt of when it was cutting-edge, between the late nineteenth century and the first few decades of the twentieth, were put into practice, developed and radicalized precisely by the cinema. Also, the formal and technological resolutions of the Baroque theatre found fuel and space for development in that same cinema. Actually, there is more than one reason that Metropolis, by Fritz Lang, in its genre, and the best films of Godard, in another, appear like horizons dreamt up by visual or plastic art in their paintings and sculpture (and also by literature), but out of their reach. Thanks to the digital and, in broader terms, the computational fields (even more so with their new quantum applications, which in turn will wipe from the map everything that we are having so much difficulty in understanding as digital), society is again reconciled with its art and, perhaps even more importantly, art is
reconciled with its era and its society. Nevertheless, regardless of how the issue is analysed, the truth is that what is now beginning to be understood as art and to be expected from art is very different from what has been understood as art (avant-garde art) for the last 150 years. It will be necessary to modify the still-prevalent idea of art, in reality attacked from all sides, among them that of the politics of identity, diversity and political correctness.

The dissolution of the author and intention

The characteristics of new art (or "art") do not appear only in the dimension of the *Creator-Manager and his focus*. Modern ideas about the author and the authorship of works of art have been present since the work of *Vasari Lives of the most excellent painters, sculptors and architects*, that arose in 1550 in Tuscany, the Silicon Valley of art at that time, and they were consolidated over the following centuries to lead to the ideas of Author and Artist consecrated by the modern age. In the mid-twentieth century, this idea began to be eroded, with Michel Foucault’s first impressive advances standing out. In his 1969 lecture entitled “What is an author?”, Foucault isolated some problematic characteristics of authorship and the creative process: 1) it is impossible to consider the idea of an author as a defined description, although it is also impossible to treat it as a common noun; 2) the author is neither the owner nor the person responsible for his texts, neither their producer nor their inventor; 3) attribution of authorship is the result of complex and rarely justified critical operations; 4) the position of the author is unstable and uncertain in the most diverse types of texts and contexts. If Foucault had lived to know the current reality of genetic algorithms (such as those used in a work such as *Eden*) he would have seen his views on the author wholly confirmed; the views that the author of History of Madness proposed in the restless and stimulating years of the second half of the sixties came onto the scene as a real drama for the *Intelligentsia*. This drama could be reflected in two fundamental questions: who speaks, behind a work of art? And to what extent is it important who speaks? Speaking is important, who does it, not so much. The absolute lack of importance of the creator of the work, of its “author” is perhaps a vestige in Foucault of Plato’s idea of the importance of the work, especially when it is “of art”, and the non-importance of its creator, of its “author”? Maybe. The fact remains: in the art or “art” of the new technological times, especially with genetic algorithms, the author or “author” does not control the whole of the process that he starts, and he cannot foresee the results which this process will produce. Technically, genetic algorithms belong to the field of metaheuristics inspired by the natural selection process that allows solutions to be obtained that are optimized for problem-solving by means of bioinspired operators (of type *mutation, hybridization and selection*) not described and noted in the initial programme. There are few central features visible today in any version of *Eden*, elaborated following the principle of genetic algorithms, that were envisaged by its author or “author”; for example, the strange sounds and noises that summon spectators to come closer to the canvas and thus “feed” cells or circles that hibernate in winter and need to feed again to stay “alive” during the next season. Who is the real author of *Eden*? What is the effective participation of the human individual Jon McCormack in the process that leads visitors to the exhibition hall to contemplate the mutant forms of *Eden*? Who or what speaks behind that work? Without the figure of Jon McCormack and without the initial programme formulated by him there would be nothing in that room, but he is not by far the sufficient cause for the existence of *Eden*. The process of *chance & choice* has never been as clear as here. In the mid-sixties, Max Bense singularly summarised the principles of information aesthetics, for example, in his book *Small Aesthetics*, which had broad repercussions in general and in Brazil in the concrete group of poets gathered around Haroldo de Campos, Décio Pignatari and Augusto de Campos, a group for which the central idea of chance & choice played a decisive role at a time when the computer was still a strange machine anchored in a laboratory, far removed from the home computer that began to make more of an appearance twenty years later, in the mid-eighties. Today, works like *Eden* make it possible to see clearly the true meaning of *chance & choice*. The idea of author is suffering an obvious process of *Auflösung*, the dissolution which Hegel spoke about in relation to art, often erroneously translated as death: in Hegel’s times, art was not dying but dissolving, just like today art known as such and its author are becoming blurred. Phenomena like Creative Commons encourage this process, in this case for more ideological than specifically technical and technological reasons, although the former can influence the latter as a representation of social relationships.
eArt

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the powerful avant-garde of art began to dissolve right after its peak; and at the beginning of the 21st century, the very notion of art as we have known it for 150 years was affected by an analogous dilution process or by a second dilution process, proving that Hegel was right. *Content and attitude in relation to society and art* change just as the form (now we must refer to it as *format*), the medium, the means of production, change too. If, for the twentieth century, art was *that*, then what now begins to be presented as art, and is not *that*, should be given another name if the rigor of scientific terminology is to be respected. In its absence, one speaks, for example, of "art", in quotation marks (*Techne* is still an appropriate denomination). Undoubtedly, all the processes of former art remain active, like a kind of ghost or almost incorporeal spirit that behaves or tries to behave as if it still existed, something natural in cultural dynamics. There are still galleries, exhibitions and art magazines (which are falling more and more out of grace, not only because they belong to the spectrum of the press in general) and auctions; if a work of dubious aesthetic value such as the *Salvator Mundi*, allegedly by Leonardo da Vinci, could be sold last November 2017 for an amazing $450,312,500 USD (of which just over 50 million dollars is the Christie’s auction house commission), this is a clear sign of a desperate effort to believe that some things still have value beyond the *simple rarity of the object*. However, the creative impulse along the lines of what used to be art is becoming exhausted: the overwhelming majority of contemporary art production is framed in the paradigm proposed by Duchamp and others even earlier. The computer-based art being developed today is actually falling on abandoned ground, a ground already ravaged by different invading armies. Criticism of an art and artists who have abandoned the nonconformist spirit, championed since the late nineteenth century, to surrender to the market becomes irrelevant, because the problem does not lie there. The new electronic art or the new electronic "art", the *EArt*, is not on the market, does not live in the market, does not depend on the market; its proponents, not to say its authors, usually live from something else (research grants, teaching at universities, technological creation in innovation laboratories, patents). It is true that occasionally something new, pertaining to that kind of *new*, is sold on the market: artists such as the Brazilian Regina Silveira deliver to their (few) buyers able to accept this idea, DVDs containing a file of the proposed "work", without a physical work ever changing hands. A "work" sold in this way and subsequently installed by the buyer himself is not a *definitive object*, is but a copy of an original susceptible to being replicated a myriad of *times* if, for example, it is erased from the wall (it is destroyed) to be replaced by another one and then it is produced again and placed on the same wall. Nonetheless, it is still very unusual for a private collector to have a version of *Eden* or of *Fearful Symmetry*; for a museum it is something possible and normal, for a collector it is not. Will there still be collectors? In this same line, it is possible to imagine or foresee the sale, in virtual stores, of partially-developed genetic algorithms, that the buyer will download onto his computer to observe and see what they end up becoming. A genetic algorithm, by definition, eliminates human intention and will, which are displaced by the predominance of mathematical equations. A single well-programmed genetic algorithm as a starting point, could even generate an unpredictable, perhaps infinite, multitude of "art" works, to the point that a single genetic algorithm might be able to meet the demand for art or "art" of *all mankind* (assuming that this still exists) for the *foreseeable future*, as well as anticipate, by computation and calculation of probabilities, what could be the next aesthetic step forward (the next "artistic innovation") and to take that step immediately. If humanity did not exist, that powerful algorithm would be able to satisfy the demand of the robots, androids or replicants that replaced it, assuming that they still need or want art or "art" after discarding humanity with the same lack of ceremony with which humanity discards ants. At that moment, and even if humanity still existed, the idea of an author would completely disappear, since all the holders of a copy of that algorithm are the authors of their respective "works", and it would no longer make sense to speak of an *author*. Likewise, it is possible a Ur-artist will appear or emerge, a Super-artist, a primary source, a divinity responsible for the whole set of "art" and "artists" scattered and isolated in their cells or individual cells, as E.M. Forster described in his masterful work *The Machine Stops*, with his personal works "of art" that each one will show others on the Internet, in a process not very different from the current exchange of photographs on Facebook or Instagram, a process that is no longer analogous at all to that known during the twentieth century and that will only take on the shape of a phantasmagoria.
Kairos

Questions continue to arise: the art that emerged after the first Modern Age, made up of the period between the Renaissance and Neoclassicism which began to exist in the second half of the nineteenth century, was it worse than the art that preceded it, precisely the Renaissance, Baroque, Neoclassical art? The contemporaries (the public, art collectors, artists and "academic" critics) of Manet, Monet, Van Gogh, Cézanne and Picasso (who spent nine years without publicly exhibiting his The Young Ladies of Avignon, of 1907, for fear of the reaction that it would provoke) strongly believed that yes, this new art was worse, infinitely worse, than the former; they were certain that new art had become vulgar, inconsequential, insulting. Monet was considered a horror, a terrible smearer of canvases, an anti-artist; yet he is currently one of the most admired painters for his art, now considered peaceful and tranquil and supreme and of devastating beauty. The new "art" of new technological media, a new technology that exposes the behavior of the human being (who will need a new concept to define this to the robots, androids and replicants that are coming) with respect to nature (that will also need a new concept), which reveals the new process of immediate production of its existence (or not) and with this, also, a new way of forming of social relationships between human beings and the intellectual representations that arise from them, it will not necessarily be worse than historical avant-garde art from the time between the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It will not be better either, it will be something else, it will be art or "art". Maybe the same thing will happen with the visual arts as what happened with the music we now call erudite: until the nineteenth century, people always listened to contemporary music, the music of their time, which was made at that time and that was the only music susceptible to be heard at that time, in the absence of any means to store and reproduce music of the past, on the contrary to what was possible after the invention of the gramophone, the jukebox, the DVD and the MP3 player, etc. The music of the past was simply unknown because there was not enough information registered about it and what existed could not be interpreted properly. When Romantic music came to dominate the concert halls in the nineteenth century, even experienced musicians did not know how to play Baroque music: the tuning forks were different, the instruments were different, they did not understand the few available scores from the past; the music of the time ruled. Later, Contemporary music (the same as we refer to contemporary art) emerged: concrete music, dodecaphonic music. However, at that time the music that dominated the musical scene was that of the past, Romantic music together with, in the middle of the twentieth century, Baroque and even Medieval music, to the point that today the "contemporary music" of Webern, Schoenberg and Berg, the whole Vienna school, has practically disappeared from the large public concert halls; Now you hear old music, music from the past. Avant-garde contemporary music, the music of today, has broken off its relationship with the public. Will the same thing happen with EArt? Heroic art against the Industrial Revolution, against the bourgeoisie, against the market (although it sells to the market), will it return to the scene even if it says goodbye to the values that marked it in its own time? As in the story Pierre Menard, author of the Quixote, by Borges, a book that today reproduced a copy of Don Quixote letter by letter, word for word, comma by comma, would be completely different from the Don Quixote of Cervantes because the times are different, the context is different, the reader is different. Today crowds flock to the Musée d’Orsay to see Monet, Manet, Van Gogh, but what they see is a ghost that has nothing to do with what was seen right there in Paris a hundred and fifty years ago. Will the same thing happen with EArt, that is, will it become invisible, yielding its position to the ghosts of Heroic Art?

Technology is a framework that limits and defines the human being, noted Heidegger, observing that humanity has to show itself capable of navigating (how appropriate this term turns out to be today) the dangerous orientations of that framing, that placing within a frame of technology itself, because only in that dangerous orientation and at that time (Kairos) can humanity be saved. When he published The question concerning technology in 1954, Heidegger had in mind the dangers which at that time threatened humanity as one of the various existential risks that it had faced throughout its history. Information technology places humanity before a new intensified existential risk because, over and above questions relating to the future of art, it is the very future of human beings that is at play. The carbon civilization created a silicon civilization that threatens to sweep the civilization that gave rise to it from the map. Heidegger seemed to believe that the framework of
technology is always ambiguous and that it is that ambiguity that paradoxically points to the mystery of revelation, that is to say, to the mystery of the truth that can, or hypothetically could, be achieved if humanity set out to follow the path opened by art to navigate that constellation of ambiguities and if humanity set out to follow the artist because it is the artist or poet, the author of the poiesis, who reveals the world as it is, within the process in which the world reveals itself. Today, that fragment of Heidegger runs the risk of sounding shamefully naive and typical of a wishful thinking that lacks a basis in fact. Heidegger could not discern the expanded horizons of information technologies and the dismissal of human will that new technologies promise. From that prism, the framework of computational technologies is no longer ambiguous, as the thinker posed, and becomes simply decisive. What do human beings want from new art in technological terms? What can man even propose as new art? Time is running out; this framework could be the last.