10.1 The cultural and creative industries

by Enrique Bustamante Ramírez

Concepts have their genesis and their evolution, sometimes also their exports and misrepresentations. Rethinking them, questioning their admitted acceptations, resituating them in their social context, is a good starting point to weigh up the research in a doubly symbolic field such as Culture: they are values on the generation and transmission of values. Culture, cultural industries, creative industries also establish limits, borders that have inevitably marked social research, beacons for the thinking that must be revealed in order to start to assess the radical specificity of this field of reality.

From cultural industries we will move on to classical culture to better understand both, by contrast and by similarity; their specificities with respect to the rest of human activity and from their special application of technology we will go on to their historical evolution in a capitalist economy towards globalization and financialization, that sets out more radically than ever the duality between economy and society, between growth and diversity. Old and new terminology fashions, such as entertainment industries or creative industries update and polarize these dilemmas, showing the growing hegemony of the market at the dawn of the Digital Age. Historical experience, evolution and cultural policy debates show that these seemingly theoretical dichotomies bring with them strong practical repercussions.

The cultural industries

The concept of cultural industries (in plural) was officially born in the mid-seventies in France with the first empirical, economic and sociological studies focused on studying the practical functioning of the large sectors of contemporary culture: the book, the cinema, records, the mass media, the radio, the television. Far from the unifying tone of its first usage by the Frankfurt School (Adorno and Horkheimer overall) and its generalist criticism of "mass culture", it aimed to study the transformations made in each sector of modern culture since the emergence of determined symbolic (cultural) content devices that allowed multiple copies to be made from an original prototype (a "master") making them more readily available to users.

However, summarising this history is useful as a context to understand the slow implantation of the term at first, faced with notable intellectual resistance, and its stunning success thirty years later. We can undoubtedly attribute authorship of the concept in its singular form ("the culture industry") to Adorno and Horkheimer as a flagship of sociological critical theory of the panorama of mass culture and communication they found in the United States during their exile: commercialization and industrialization were destroying the autonomy of designers and the subversive capacity of culture, subordinating its consumption to the capitalist dynamic (Adorno, T., Horkheimer, M., 1994).

The condemnation of this banalization of culture, established in diverse controversies with functionalist American authors that Umberto Eco called the fight between the apocalyptic and the integrated in his book “Apocalypse Postponed” (Eco, U., 1981), erred however, on both fronts, with an essentialist value of an art, whose supposed golden age (art independent of power, subversive) is impossible to find in history.
Umberto Eco

"In fact, an indiscriminate use of a fetish concept such as “the culture industry” basically implies, an inability to accept these historical events and – with them – the prospect of a humanity that is capable of changing the course of history" (p. 19)

"Once the cultural industry is correctly understood to be a system of conditioning linked to the phenomena listed above, the discourse becomes less generalized and is articulated on two complementary planes: firstly, the analytical description of the various phenomena; and secondly of their interpretation in light of the historical context in which they appear“ (p. 20) (ECO, U., 1981)

However, at the heart of this branch of critical theory we must highlight the prior lucid reflexion of Walter Benjamin, whose work, especially in a famous and illustrious article, held a relatively optimistic view for humanity of an art which lost its "aura" (the ritual linked to the time and place of its inception), and which was demystified and emancipated from power to allow, for the first time in history, - photography, cinema..- to be taken in the hands of its beholders (Benjamin, W., 1937):

Walter Benjamin

"For the first time in world history, mechanical reproduction emancipates the work of art from its parasitical dependence on ritual. To an ever-greater degree the work of art reproduced becomes the work of art designed for reproducibility. From a photographic negative, for example, one can make any number of prints; to ask for the “authentic” print makes no sense. But the instant the criterion of authenticity ceases to be applicable to artistic production, the total function of art is reversed.”

"That which withers in the age of mechanical reproduction is the aura of the work of art. The technique of reproduction detaches the reproduced object from the domain of tradition. By making many reproductions it substitutes a plurality of copies for a unique existence. And in permitting the reproduction to meet the beholder or listener in his own particular situation, it reactivates the object reproduced”. (BENJAMIN, W., 1937)

A similar line to that followed by Bertold Brecht during the time that he collaborated with Benjamin, in his collection of essays, Radio Theory (Brecht, B., 1932) would eventually go on to mark the debate on the democratization of the new digital media until the present day. In any event, and like all of the theory from the Frankfurt school, these concepts fell into the desert of oblivion for a long time until the seventies, when they would again be published in various languages (in Spain, translated by, and sometimes with a prologue by, Jesús Aguirre, who later became the Duke of Alba).

Retaking our common thread in this period towards the operational conception of the CIs, it must be noted that, for the first time, in the mid-seventies – although with illustrious antecedents such as that of Raymond Williams in the United Kingdom (scholar of the press and television which he called flow, emphasising the revolution that they would mean for culture) (Williams, R., 1992), a scientific approach to the profound changes undergone by contemporary culture in the age of capitalism and its industrialization was undertaken, which did not hinder a critical but balanced view of its development: on the plus side is the socialization of culture as had never before occurred in the history of man; and on the negative, is the conversion of cultural creations into merchandise aiming to achieve maximum profits in a mass market, leaving aside their social role. Definitively, to speak of cultural industries effectively means to recognise that a large part of modern culture, that with the greatest economic and social impact, has become industrialized in order to survive, but that that process and its commercialization does not eliminate its double-sided aspect: the economic side of growth and
employment, but also the ideological side as a fundamental source of the shared values of our society, and thus an essential platform for social redistribution, for democratic participation.

It thus attempted to differentiate classical culture, characterized by a unique original, -as in painting or sculpture, or performed live on each occasion, as in the performing arts-, from industrialized culture, that is to say, that which undergoes a process of unlimited reproduction, and where the value of the prototype or the "master" (as the creation of a musical recording or a film is referred to in professional jargon) is in its mass reproduction.

**Cultural Industrialization**

However, this industrialization process brings with it many other added changes:

*Requires an investment of capital (in production, distribution and exhibition).

*Means the application of fixed standards to the creation (running times, genres, formats...) in order to make mass production possible with measured costs (forms, running times, contents, codes...), difficult to reconcile with the demand for constant renovation.

*Means aiming at mass markets in order to make the investment profitable and maximise returns.

*Plays with the peculiar characteristic of all information economies: high fixed costs (to produce the prototype), but low or non-existent variable costs (per individual consumer).

*Holds high economic risks in every launch but promises enormous returns in direct proportion to the size of the market obtained (economies of scale).

(for more on this topic see: Bustamante, E., Coord., 2003):

Historically, the cultural industries were born in the last third of the 19th Century and not by coincidence but due to the conjunction of scientific-technical development with the transformation of a society that had more leisure time and started to have more disposable income available to attend to these new cultural "needs". Technical innovation appears and triumphs when a latent social demand is requires it.

It does not appear to be a mere coincidence for example, that the phonograph (Edison) was invented in 1876, and the gramophone (Berliner) in 1889 to create the phonographic musical industry; or that in 1895 Edison’s kinetoscope together with the Lumière brothers led to the birth of the cinema; or that publishing and the mass press were established after the innovations of the rotary printing press (Applegath and Bullock) between 1846 and 1865 and Mergenthaler’s linotype (1886); or that, finally, collective innovations gave rise to the radio from 1895 and to the television between 1910 and 1925.

As Patrice Flichy has shown, many of these inventions failed in their initial usage plans and only became successful when they created or played appropriate contents and when they generated a demand that allowed them to build a financing model and sustainable profitability (see Flichy, P. 1980). Thus, some innovative technologies started to create autonomous sectors of cultural activity, made up of determined cultural contents (with distinct languages and standards) plus reproduction devices, plus social uses, plus a financing plan, to become, within a few decades, the prevailing activities in the culture of our times, the means for the creation and transmission of the ideas and values of society that are hegemonic in our developed societies.
Definition of C.I.s

In pragmatic terms, C.I.s can be defined as "a series of symbolic creations that, reproduced in multiple copies on both material and immaterial formats, go out in search of their recipients" (Bustamante, E, (2003), p.21).

In economic terms, C.I.s are "a set of industrial branches, segments and auxiliary activities, producing and distributing goods with symbolic contents, conceived by creative work, organized by an appreciating capital and finally destined to the consumer markets, with an ideological and social reproduction function" (Zallo, R., 1988a, p.26).

The reference point. Commercialized classical culture

To integrally calibrate the cultural industries, to situate them in their historic evolution and to evaluate their relationships nevertheless requires an important parenthesis to deal with classical culture, that which we have inherited from centuries of civilization although it has had to adapt in contemporary times to the market economy in order to survive. Some classifications of cultural products thus anticipated the primary division between barely-reproducible products and those products that are infinitely reproducible (Huet and others, 1978)

Singularity of Classical Culture

A priori, and as an expansion of the definitions of the C.I.s that we have mentioned, we can agree on a series of singular characteristics, with their economic and social nature differentiating them from every other industrial or commercial product:

- An idea inscribed on a medium, based on a unique original different from the rest of the artistic creation.

- Rooted in the symbolic work of the human mind with the traditional obsession to demand the least possible technological intervention (artisan work).

- Their social and market value comes from the unique value of that prototype, -closely linked to the author-, and which is, by definition, non-reproducible, although in recent times there have been notable exceptions (lithographs, xerographs, etc, of a painting, numbered and signed to inherit a shared part of the value of the original).

- Their adaptation to the capitalist market to survive, they have had to face the handicap of having a unique original, uncopyable and unrepeateable in the midst of a logic that seeks a mass market-, and which must therefore be re-produced on every occasion (just as with the performing arts), in the time and place of every consumer. It is, therefore, an economy of scarcity (the work of an author, a style, the performances of a company . . .)

- They are divided into very different sectors according to their format and their greater or lesser social legitimacy. In particular there are two main sectors: the performing arts or live shows (such as theatre, dance, live concerts, opera, ) and the visual arts (such as painting, sculpture and all their various derivations). "Literature" is not included in this group because its means of expression, reading and writing, comes from very diverse cultural activities, from the theatre or opera libretto to poetry readings, from the novel to essays edited by multiple readers.
However, this long-standing "classical culture", has accumulated the rich teachings of scientific research, and cannot be far-removed from the cultural industries (at the end of the day, its natural extension). We must start by considering whether the "classical culture that we know today has been the same for all of the history of mankind: until the Renaissance, art and crafts did not have different meanings, because both were integrated into the utilitarian functions of social life; and, even more, originality was not a universal value in those times, but the artist, considered as simple divine expression in the more illustrious cases, systematically produced copies with total social legitimacy. Classical culture had invented by then many of the serialization processes that we know today in the C.I.s: the event, the remake, the retake, the saga, the spin-off, . . .

It is curious to point out that Culture, since the 10th Century understood as a specialized activity that is separate from rest of social life, still with a history of thinkers from centuries ago, started its empirical scientific journey in the seventies, barely a decade before the start of reflection on C.I.s, at least in the two disciplines that we are especially interested in: economy and sociology.

The first field, Cultural Economics, which has today become a prosperous branch of economic research, was officially founded by the studies of William Baumol and William Bowen, two economists that the Ford Foundation had commissioned to study the Broadway theatres that it sponsored for pragmatic reasons (the constant increase in costs and the stagnation of income). In 1966, the results of this study transcended the commission, to become a framework for the whole economy of classical culture: Live shows, they said, belonged to an "archaic" sector of the economy, because their central place of work is the work of the human mind, not replaceable by capital or machinery, which means not susceptible to constant increases in productivity. As a consequence, while salaries (costs) were in line with the rest of the economy, permanently on the rise, income (entrance fees) was not increasing in the same proportion (inelastic demand) (Baumol, W.J., Bowen, W.G., 1966).

The conclusion of this study, reiterated later by these and many other authors in different contexts, is that the crisis of these activities is not cyclical but structural: "In the performing arts, crisis is apparently a way of life". Or, said more conclusively, determined artistic activities (based on a unique original) cannot be sustainable by simply playing the market, without that which is generally known as Baumol’s "disease" or "syndrome" requiring additional funding channels (from the State to private patronage).

A similar role as founder of the Sociology of Culture can be attributed to the thinker Pierre Bourdieu, among whose many theoretical and empirical achievements we here pick out two that will also be of great use to us in understanding the C.I.s: the historical determination of the autonomy of the arts, that reached its peak at the end of the 19th Century with the conception of "art for art’s sake", and the "cultural capital" that determines "taste" to a large extent, cultural consumption of a social nature. Thus, an elaboration of knowledge is shown respectively in the cultural offer (creation, production) and in the demand (consumption, the user’s "taste").

In the first sphere, Bourdieu analyses the culmination of the slow historical constitution of that cultural field by opposition to the control of the State and of the capital, with Flaubert or Rimbaud, Chateaubriand, Musset or Victor Hugo, resulting in the creation of the figure of the autonomous artist (and, by extension of the intellectual) over and above the reasons of State and the pursuit of money that Emile Zola depicts at the height of his fame in "J’accusé". Thus "the Arts" is conceived, a relatively autonomous universe in the political and economic field; a network in charge of defining beauty, art, although always blighted (in the absence of a central bank, as in Academia, and formalized codification systems as in the University), by internal battles in permanent conflict (between academies, the established avant-garde, the unorthodox avant-garde) in a discourse of continuous innovation (Bourdieu, P,1992.). Likewise Bourdieu puts forward, together with those elements that historically situate the role of the artist (and therefore, also of royalties and copyright), valuable for the analysis of the C.I.s, for example as they reiteratively distinguish between two life cycles excluding the enterprise of cultural production, those of a "short production cycle" (adjustment to demand, fast mass
circulation, high obsolescence) and those of a "long cycle" (acceptance of risk, innovation), or, expressed in another way, the opposition between "works made for the public and works the public themselves must make" (Id. p. 304).

In the sphere of cultural consumption, and therefore of the constitution of taste, Bourdieu has also provided transcendental conclusions that, born from empirical research, like visitors’ attendance and reading in great museums, study in depth the keys of cultural habits, rejecting the prejudice of an "innate" (genetic?) predisposition for art. These cultural habits would thus be indelibly marked by the "cultural capital" (of family, education) of each individual, sector or class of the population, although the dominant classes prefer to erase that inherited origin and attribute such a privilege to predestination, "under the appearance of total legitimacy". And, however, that cultural privilege, and the consequent discrimination, is never as great as in "free culture" (away from the school environment) (Bourdieu, P., Dartel, A., 2003).

The uncertainties of Culture

From Bourdieu’s studies and those of some of his continuators, we can also extract the characteristics of the socioeconomic nature of classical culture (commercialized) which are useful in the analysis of the C.I.s:

*Cultural creations contain their own code of interpretation and therefore do not meet established standards that allow their "quality" to be measured. So, their market price (that has little to do with their production costs) does not allow their value in use (aesthetic, of enjoyment and pleasure), or their exchange value (social status) to be determined.

*The users’ uncertainty is therefore absolute, because there is no guide for choosing goods that only consumption can mitigate (with costs in time and money); which allows them to be defined as "experience goods" ("C’est en lisant qu’on devient liseron" as they say; you can only become a reader by reading, we could translate). But this risk becomes financial randomness for the producer who can never be sure if he will find the demand and profit required to cover his costs.

*To defend themselves against this threat, producers soon applied marketing procedures, such as serialization (genres, format, series, …) destined to "tie down" and build customer loyalty for subsequent launches. But overall, they invented the "catalogue effect": the accumulation of a high number of works aimed at "cross subsidising" each other: from the successes to the failures, the fast, mass selling works to the minority, slow-selling ones; the proven successes to the risky innovations …

*In every sector "symbolic bankers" emerge (critics, but also producers, gallery owners, editors, advertising agents in more recent times…) accumulators of prestige, mediators between the supply and the demand, but who also act as endorsers of artistic values, situating a work in the history of art, valuing its innovation, contributing to setting its social and economic value (Herscovici, 1994)

*Faced with such uncertainties, the consumption of culture involves undeniable promises; the infinite character of its "necessity", the use and enjoyment of which strengthens future demand; or its non-competitive character, where its consumption does not discriminate or deteriorate its shared use by all potential users (like all of the information economy).

Many of these characteristics, as we will see further on, have been inherited or copied by the C.I.s, among them the obsession with radical originality linked to the author (that is the basis of intellectual property rights and its derivations), or the necessary prior accumulation of symbolic capital (prestige) in order to base its economic value on the market, or the generation of chains of "symbolic bankers" to guide the consumer.
Models and Stages of C.I.s

Empirical research into the C.I.s has revealed strong points in their common forms that are extremely useful in the classification and analysis of their set of developments in any country or on an international level. We particularly highlight here the key stages of the operation of all the C.I.s and the types of sectors that make up the C.I.s.

The major stages of production of the C.I.s

As mesoeconomics (the study of sectors) has shown us in the French tradition, and the same as in any other economic sector, the value chain of a C.I. can be represented by a vertical flowchart that follows the metaphor of a river: it goes from the Mountain (the raw materials) to the Valley (commercialization and the consumer): All the successful market sectors have built, since the early years of their operation, a similar scale of the division of work to obtain maximum sales and profitability of their cultural contents.

*At the mountain peak: are the creators of symbolic goods, the authentic original centre of culture, based on unique prototypes that, with greater or lesser technological investment, they are not so different from those of classical culture except in their awareness of aiming at a mass market and the predominant agents along the way.

-Next on this apparently vertical scale are the producers or editors who invest capital in determined creations to ensure their reproduction and enable their mass circulation. Apparently therefore they become intermediaries between the supply (the creations) and the demand (the public), but they have a strategic function that goes much further than that: they play a censorship role (they determine whether it reaches the market or not), and thus endorse creative styles and tastes, they shape promotion and branding work, to a large extent they shape the cultural taste of the users.

-Next in the production line (and the creation of value) are the distributors, who transport, store and, where appropriate, distribute copies of cultural resources.

Their function appears to be minor, to ensure availability and visibility of the copies to the users, but they play a strategic and powerful role as any cultural products that are not directly mass distributed will be marginalized from the mass market. It is a job that in a climate of important national markets, or even international or global ones in recent times, requires huge investments and risks.

-They are followed in the chain by the marketer, distribution and capillary sales points that reach the user and his environment (bookshops, record stores, cinemas). This is a lesser but still essential role, that increases in market influence when concentrated in large chains and powerful companies, or when combined with any of the above steps.
-Finally, at the valley end where the whole process leads, is the consumer, who selects each cultural creation with his and available time budget and using the information, attainability and accessibility of each cultural asset.

Naturally, each type of Cultural Industry has varied in this process at each of the different stages (the cinema, in little more than a decade). Thus, state-licenced Radio and Television channels take on the tasks of producing of many of their programmes, that of packaging their services (scheduling), that of distribution (contributing to a mass telecommunications network) and that of marketing their spaces (charging the user in time and the advertiser in money for this). They thereby amassed enormous power that for years was based on using a broadcasting licence as the right to print bank notes.

We must also note, successive historical swings in the importance and the market power of each stage: the creators, initially innovators and full of vitality, started to see their rights usurped by the producers-editors as the latter acquired economic and legal power. In a world of growing national and international competition, the distributors became a bottleneck of profits and cultural power as they were revealed to be an network that is essential to reach a mass market, often prevailing over the editors. In general terms, it can be said that in all the great C.I.s the market power (percentage of the final profits but also the capacity to alleviate risk) moves from the mountain to the valley, from the control of the raw materials to the control of final marketing and knowledge and management of the users (the keys of modern marketing in other words).

This chart, apparently vertical and linear, in fact contains much more complex dynamics that start to show if we consider that the financial flow goes from the valley back up to the mountain: the money comes from the valley (the user, the advertiser) crossing back up through each stage to reach the creator. Not without a certain cynicism, some analysts have pointed out that water flows upwards very badly, which portends that the creators will always have the highest rates of financial droughts.
Two development poles of the C.I.s

The Cultural Industries have generated two major techno-economic models (the conjunction of technology with remuneration models) over more than a century, that have contributed to organising their development both in the analogical world and in the digital one. More than just closed typologies, they are great social logic systems established in the medium term, from two powerful development poles that have marked the birth and configuration of the majority of the sectors.

- **PUBLISHED PRODUCTS**: (such as the mass-produced book, the record, the cinema):
  
  - These are single products launched onto the market in an isolated way, or in small packets of information, and that are therefore subject to a high risk on each launch to find enough demand.
  
  - They are reproduced in a physical format that the consumer has to go somewhere to find (bookshop, record store, cinemas)
  
  - They are paid for by the consumer,
  
  - And usually have a long shelf life

- **FLOW CULTURE**: (like radio or television)
  
  - Products are inserted into a time flow (scheduling)
  
  - Reproduced and distributed in an abstract format (economic services) to the users’ domicile
  
  - Indirectly financed by the consumer’s time and attention (advertising)
  
  - High level of market obsolescence (loss of value in the instant of their broadcast)

The comparison of these two models with the first (cinema) and second generation of audio-visuals (television) is quite revealing:

* The Cinema faced huge levels of risk, with the majors achieving one or two successes out of every ten releases. It had to resort to strategies of extensive catalogues and commit to huge investments in marketing and advertising on each new blockbuster release to minimize the risk without ever managing to completely remove it. What is more, it had to develop marketing strategies (communication) to tie down the demand: star system, studio system, remakes, retakes, sagas, spin offs . . .

* The Television on the other hand, uses the catalogue strategy in its daily or weekly scheduling: the most popular programmes systematically subsidize those with less advertising income, the successes subsidize the failures, tried and tested formulas subsidize innovative and risky ones. Being seemingly "free" to the user provides greater relative stability by means of the advertising market and means less risk to investments.

We are referring to sectors of the culture industry in the case of homogeneous activities, whose only objective is the creation and transmission of symbolic values, that have managed to create an autonomous value chain (always relatively speaking) with respect to others: when a reproduction device, combined with a type of content, has managed to generate a demand and a business model that has allowed it to be sustainable in
10.1. The cultural and creative industries

time. For example, the Phonographic or Discographic Industry, the Cinematographic Industry, the Publishing Industry, the Radiophonic Industry or the Television Industry, that are also those that have attained the greatest social influence and economic weight in modern society. But we must not forget that there are many other autonomous sectors of the C.I.s, like the comic for instance, where the subordination of the creator to the newspaper editor or to the American "syndicates" (agencies) is well-documented; or artistic photography, that while being a minority and economically precarious has had its era of prosperity; or the poster industry that was hugely important in some periods of history, ...

The existence of some C.I.s that do not fit in with these strict poles has also been discussed, or those that are a hybrid of both models. Such as instalments or single published products that are linked by a periodicity (which lowers the risk of each one), like books or records that make up part of a catalogue paid for with regular payments by users (book clubs...), or like the daily newspaper that packages together in one paper a large amount of organized information, is published at regular intervals and is financed at the same time by payment from the reader and from advertising (double market).

**Televisión as a strict C.I.**

In a historical vision, "television has become the leading cultural industry not only due to the importance of its offer and its consumption, or to the capital role that it plays in the promotion and marketing of the other remaining culture industries, but it is also the only cultural industry in the strict sense" (Bustamante, E. 1999, p. 25). And this is due to:

*The standardization of the product (genres, formats, running times, rhythms...)*

*The rationalization of distribution (programmatic strategy ruled by marketing)*

*The industrialization of the whole production process (continuous manufacturing),*

*Its extreme division of work (technical and creative) that requires a stable ratio of employees.*

The expansion of these studies has been significant, although always relative, because the orthodox functionalists of communication theory ignore them or pretend to consider them as a simple study of the sector, -as if they did not already question from the core all the classical studies on mass communication – in order to better hang on to their old viewpoints of transmitter-receptor, to their mediacentric and reductionist perspectives. Even so, just like political parties that obtain wide majorities, concepts that emerge quickly run the risk of "dying of success". And this has been the case of the Cultural Industries, which in their rising trajectory of barely three decades, have spawned and continue to create as much abuse as distortion and excess. As Bernard Miège reminded us, "the use of the term "cultural industries" always causes confusion and incomprehension" (Miège, B., 2000). However, this probably occurs with all ambitious concepts of social science that do not only evolve as living beings, but are also twisted, altered and sometimes manipulated.

Thus, there have been those who have insisted on confusing classical cultural activities that are more or less adapted to the market with the cultural industries, referring to museums for example as a "great cultural industry", confusing the complexity or the size of the industry; there are even those who have placed painting among the C.I. sectors, even though both of these lack, sine qua non, the conditions of serialization and mass reproduction. Furthermore, from angles as diverse as economic or employment studies, the mistake has repeatedly been made of including the manufacture of equipment used by the C.I.s in the chapter on culture, exaggerating the weight of these sectors of culture but degrading their diagnosis and confusing their cures.
More often than not, researchers complain about not seeing their academic or professional activities included among the main sectors of the C.I.s, such as photography or advertising, which they consider to be an omission worth protesting about. This confusion may be blamed on the complexity of certain economic concepts like industry, sector and branch, the object of diverse interpretations but in which always can be claimed a singular unit of processes that go integrally from the author, the work and its mass reproduction, to the demand and a specific public, with their resulting uses.

The majority of the empirical studies on the analogical C.I.s has respected these conditions, although they may favour those activities with greater economic and social importance: the record industry and the film industry, book publishing, the press, the radio and the television. Indeed, others, by no means insignificant, could be added, like the comic (in newspapers, magazines or books), that could also be included as part of the creation of contents or sub-branches within their respective products. And even photography when, as an autonomous art form, it is transmitted from the author to the consumer in the form of a publication (gallery, magazine, book) but its use in exhibitions is usually included among the visual arts, that is, as a part of an artisan culture comparable to painting, because paradoxically what predominates in that commercial use is its character as a unique original (vintage for example) and not that of an infinitely reproducible copy. In any event, what cannot by any means be included in the photography "sector" is everything from the manufacture of hardware (equipment) to the auxiliary industries (development), from fashion or food photography to "w&c" (weddings and christenings) using the simple technology link to exaggerate the social and economic importance of a device that, anyway, nobody is disputing.

Advertising also deserves a separate mention and has on occasion been included in our studies due to its huge double importance: as a funding method for the majority of C.I.s and also as a formidable machine that generates and integrates symbolic contents in the most diverse formats, in many Cultural Industries but also outside of them (Bustamante y Zallo, 1988; Zallo, 1988a). Thus, to consider it as a sector or a standardised branch, in spite of its common dynamics that are already highlighted by advertising studies, would stop us from distinguishing its capacity to adapt to each branch of the C.I.s and even, conversely, its power to force the C.I.s and even artisan cultural activities to adapt to the advertising dynamics, both economic and creative, themselves.

We could also make a reference to tourism, sometimes totally or partially branded as a "cultural industry" in a generic sense. However, it seems clear that this expression refers to the use of determined cultural elements, generally coming from artisan culture - museums, historical buildings, artistic heritage in general, festivals – as elements that supposedly attract a large part of the tourist demand and, as a consequence, as an instrument of economic policy.

Although coincidentally, this type of tourism is as cited and glorified as it is difficult to measure, as much in its effective economic impact as in its social repercussions, welcome as it always is in its contribution to maintaining and valuing heritage, as long as it is not confused with the Cultural Industries.

**Technology, Culture, Communication**

In the preceding pages, we have repeatedly referred to the relationship between Technology and Culture, as an essential link to base the appearance of the C.I.s on and sustain their development and renovation. We have also repeatedly mentioned mass communication as an intrinsic constituent of the C.I.s. Both connections are worth stopping a moment to reflect on even if this is a synthetic reflexion because their consequences run through all of the history and analysis of the C.I.s from their analogical origin through their digital evolution. To forget or take for granted these relationships in accordance with "common sense" has led to serious
misunderstandings or, even worse, strong manipulations that have contributed to twist both marketing strategies and public cultural policy.

In the first place, if we reflect on technology and technical skill, we can see that while the two are often confused in English, they are used in very different senses in Spanish that uses the word technology to refer to material bases (physics, chemistry...) and how they work compared to the technical skill or know how (saber hacer, savoir faire) required to use the devices, that is to say applied science compared to culture and social values that determine what to do with it.

Secondly, technology, by definition, the opposite of nature, is necessarily determined by its social environment: the scientific-technical development of each era, the demands and mentalities of each society, how progress is adopted into a specific production environment... It is thus interesting to consider the myth of technology being a neutral tool, with no prefiguration whatsoever, that can be used for good or evil (with the typical example of the hammer that can be used to build or to kill). As Raymond Williams pointed out, “technical inventions come from within societies” (Williams, R., 1992. p. 184). And Zallo reminded us that for Marx, science and technical skill are considered as “social forms of the production forces of the capital, materialized in machinery and knowledge, organized as capital, in a process that includes the increasing submission of work to capital (Zallo, R., 1988a, p. 19).

In the symbolic field, that includes both Culture and social Communication, technological innovations and their social applications are even more marked by the social know-how of each period of history. In the face of the usual simplistic “who did it first” story (the Cleopatra effect described by Paul Beaud), is the evidence that many of the great inventions from the last third of the 19th Century emerged simultaneously or almost simultaneously in different countries and by completely different inventors; and as we have previously pointed out, the initial design of many of these devices does not resemble in any way the uses widely adopted later. This is what happened between Edison’s phonograph and Berliner’s disc gramophone, or between the kinetoscope and the cinema, but also between the radio and the telephone, or between the radio and the television with cables, or without them. In contrast to the perfectionist linear vision lineal the official story pushes on us (a continuous and finalist progress), we often find advances and setbacks, a high number of often forgotten failures, and even huge apparent improvements that were ignored for long periods.

Some historians and economists of these technologies have highlighted that, as well as a certain scientific development, applied to the mass production of symbolic messages (hardware), it was also necessary to invent uses linked to an artistic project (contents, or software), in order to ultimately achieve a form of remuneration (a business model as we would say nowadays). In this way, Patrice Flichy has meticulously gone over each of these “cultural” inventions to demonstrate that their initial planned uses were not successful and that their industrialists were forced to test others on the market: the phonograph allowed recording and playing but the passive disc and the gramophone were more successful; the kinetoscope was launched as a coin machine in the American arcades but soon became a group spectacle; the radio was used to send music from one point to another, but went on the be used as a link between radio enthusiasts and finally became a method for on broadcaster to communicate with many listeners; while the telephone followed the exact opposite route in the change from radio waves to cables which produced several different successful devices until the era of widespread digitalization of the television and the mobile phone becoming ubiquitous.

To follow this conception of technology in culture, sealed by economic and social forces, is hugely useful to escape from technologist determinism and the many interested myths surrounding it up until digitalization (as we will see in different subjects of this course). Because it requires a scientific mentality, empirical and complex, ready to analyse at any given time—and in any country— how to apply and expand on each cultural or communication technology (what and who for?). In general historic terms, Flichy himself has given a rough outline of this process, from the optical or electrical telegraph (army and State communication passed to the

Observatorio Cultural del Proyecto Atalaya

Manuel Atalaya
Apoio a la Gestión Cultural

10. IDEAS, CULTURE IN THE 21ST CENTURY

10.1. The cultural and creative industries
business world and later on to mass society) to group spectacles and their evolution (from the theatre or circus to the cinema with sound but silent), or to family communication in the home (the radio, later the television) and finally mobile communication and in an individual bubble (the Walkman, the transistor radio, the mobile phone (Flichy, P., 1991), right up to interactive communication and its offshoots.

The technologies of C.I.s would thus be the result of a long dialectical process between innovation plus randomness, of probity and error, which would have left along the way much of its interactive and horizontal potential to adopt vertical and passive forms. And this, as Flichy points out, not by a conspiracy conception but by the mere conjunction between market logic and technology in the search for mass markets and maximum profitability, which always favours passive, unidirectional messages, that is to say limited, censored, authoritarian ones (Flichy, P., 1980).

In recent times, the line of great lone inventors has been replaced by R+D teams in big corporations, that use marketing in their designs themselves, although not necessarily thereby avoiding mistakes and resounding failures.

Lucien Febvre

“Every era has its technical skills and these technical skills follow the style of the era. A style that shows how far everything is linked and plays a role in human events: like, if you will, technical skill is influenced by what could be referred to as general history and at the same time acts on that history”


Generally, above these empirical observations, that try to draw lessons for the future from the relationship between technology and society, we have seen mythological visions, often not in the least bit innocent, that tried to impose a unilateral and determinist vision in which Technology modified or even revolutionized society. Thus, there have been a long series of "techno-utopias" that, in contrast with the classic genre of the literary utopia, in its roots, subversive and antisystem (usually set in an imaginary time and place), almost always run in parallel to the interests of the established power. They start with communication between people and goods (roads, canals, bridges, railways) to go on to follow the rhythm of innovations in immaterial communication (the telegraph, electricity, mass social communication), spurred on by the marriage of science-technology but generally projected as promises of social regeneration and change (Mattelart, 2000, Flichy, 1995; Proulx., 1992).

In more recent terms, Philippe Breton’s research on the thinking of Norbert Wiener revealed and contextualized an influential origin in the work of this author back in the 1940s. Promoter of a kind of "anthropological Utopia", Wiener focused his hopes of new man and of new society in cybernetics, which places communication at the very centre of the world, like an alternative to the entropy, the disorder, the disintegration and the barbarism that the Two World Wars had revealed. In this context of crises and hopelessness, communication and its machines were destined to provide a new rationality, a sign however that they were not appropriate for military or commercial power. The thinking of Wiener, a kind of "rational anarchism" would spread especially after the late sixties, with a notable influence in the United States (Breton, 1995)

More precedent would have obviously have to be cited to contextualize thinking on the Information Society since its official beginning. For example, the obvious case of the technological messianism of MacLuhan, based on the mechanistic materialism of his master Innis, with his visions of the construction of human civilization on the back of technological innovations in communication. With even more practical influence, we should recall the American theorists of the second-generation American “Mass Communication Research”, such as De Sola
Pool, Lerner and Everett Rogers, who, on the wake of economists like Rostow, led the development plans of international organizations in the 1960s with their "diffusion" theories: if each stage of Civilization was linked to technologies, the expansion of information technologies was going to be the main spring to "modernize" backward societies starting from their elites, and to enable their take-off towards development (the move from primary to industrial economies). These theories had dramatic practical repercussions for years, at a time when the United States unarguably dominated international organizations (the UN, post-war UNESCO).

It is not our intention in this text to analyse this long history, but only to point out that the utopias born around these "founding" technologies make it possible to illuminate the root of many of the metaphors and proposals that today are presented as radically new in the dominant mythological thinking; for example, in the current influence of Saint Simon and his disciples of utopian socialism on the discourse of the "Information Superhighways", shown by Pierre Musso and Armand Mattelart in recent studies (Musso, 1997; Mattelart, 1995).

To point it out briefly will thus allow us later, in subjects directly linked to the Digital Age, to follow the branches of a particular utopian way of thinking, that which makes communication the single centre of all its projections (of transparency, development, Justice...), and that with recent non-casual history after the Second World War has been developed since five decades ago up until today. A discourse almost entirely dominated by the vision of power, even when it appears marginally fed by counterculture, a veritable "conservative utopia" (total promise of happiness over the acceptance of the present; Piemme, 1974), which makes communication, its networks and its technical skills, a true ideology, and even a "new religion" (Sfez, 1988), promised for everyone, everywhere and in the immediate future. As we shall see later, in recent times the Internet has become the centre and favoured object of those speeches that hide reality rather than clarify it.

As we see above, communication determinism and techno-utopias have generally been linked to those of culture, showing an indissoluble relationship in the social reality that however has been rejected by many currents of thought and many authors, and even by many Governments, bent on separating Culture (as a social element) from mass communication (presumably only political and commercial). Among other reasons, because in this way, the general interest of the former, susceptible to protective regulations, could be separated from the complete commercialization of the media.

And yet it is evidently absurd to attempt to separate the actions of culture from the Mass Media that today drives the vast majority of the socially visible culture, thus contributing via multiple channels to forming tastes and our habits of cultural consumption. As Mattelart recently stated, "There can be no cultural diversity without media diversity.

There can be no cultural diversity without communication policies "(Mattelart, A., 2006, p. 17); Or, as Martín Barbero himself pointed out, "the traditional actors of cooperation have taken too long to learn that communication is An integral component of cultural life, as a culture is only alive while it is able to communicate, exchange and interact with other cultures ") (Martín Barbero, J., 2006). Or, in other words, any cultural creation requires a more or less explicit communication plan in order to be socially projected, but in the same way all social communication implicitly carries cultural values, that is to say ideological ones (not in political or partisan terms, but regarding ideas about the shaping of society).

In short, the so-called "mass media" (the press, radio or especially television), are a few other sectors of the C.I.S., characterized like all of them by the application of a technology of infinite reproduction of symbolic products, among which it is impossible to separate culture (the creation of social, ideological values) from "information" (current affairs or not), beyond a typology of genres and formats that are less and less identifiable in contemporary media. But in addition, these media turn out to be the most systematic places in contemporary society for direct or commissioned cultural products, the most powerful platforms for the
dissemination of these cultural contents, and the most influential places for the promotion of culture in all its forms.

**Historical evolution of the C.I.s: Globalization and financialization**

The history of many of the major C.I.s, such as the film or record industries, clearly shows the spontaneous consequences in a capitalist economy of the special characteristics that we have mentioned above, especially of its giant economies of scale (the possibility of the rapid growth of the rate of profit per product if the size of the market increases: the American Majors appeared quickly in just a few years as soon as the business model of these sectors and their concentration was consolidated, with names and brands that are still around today, and their early concentration on a national level expanded rapidly internationally, almost globally, after the two World Wars, on the back of the growing dominance of distribution networks and the ensuing power of marketing and advertising. Something similar is happening in publishing, in the more powerful language markets, although in this case language barriers slow globalization.

The emergence of these cultural giants with huge catalogues of contents and, particularly products of increasing international success is even more paradoxical in sectors that the economy qualifies as having "low barriers to entry" (small investments and risks required to start competing); a proven reality in the general presence of thousands of small and medium-sized enterprises, which play an essential role as sources of innovation, but whose risks and scarce profit margins make them increasingly dependent on the strategies of large companies or groups. In the media like the press and, especially radio and television, subjected to state concessions or licenses, economies of scale and links between politics and the economy will lead to even more rapidly concentrated structures (few stakeholders sharing the majority of the market), in an environment with little competition.

The decades of the seventies and eighties are the scenario of processes of rapid concentration of these companies in more and more powerful groups. The majority of the large national and international groups opted for vertical growth towards the mountain (towards the creation) or towards the valley (the marketing, the financing), in each sector of the C.I.s but also, increasingly horizontal (creating various different media forms in the same sector) and in multimedia form (in various sectors of culture and communication) in what was called a "multimedia" strategy, whose supposed competitive virtues were based on a "synergy" that was irresistible to the large groups that achieved it (feedback between launches and cultural activities of many types). The Times Warner Group, diversified from the press to the cinema and television and organized into multiple divisions according to sector (from the initial Atari video games to the comic, literature or television) worked for many years as a supreme example of that business model that would give them an unbeatable advantage over their competitors.

By that time, these branches of business started debates on the consequences that such strategies might have on cultural and ideological pluralism. However, a lot of research also pointed out the dire consequences that this race towards the greatest possible size was having on many giants of communication and culture that were failing, going bankrupt and even dissolving as a result of the debt and the enormous risks assumed. The disappearance or dismemberment of groups like Maxwell in the United Kingdom, Kirch in Germany, Vivendi in France..., was accredited proof that the history of the winners has managed to make people forget.

But the concentration process of culture and communication businesses accelerated in the nineties and 2000s, both globally and nationally: Herman and McChesney point out that at the top level there are just six global giants who have an enormous amount of the world business, with a clear predominance of American
companies; and that on the next level, local companies "have evolved into conglomerates of regional and local media. As such, they enjoy the benefits of sales and cross-promotions on the scale of their economies in the same way as those of the top level do on a global scale" (Hermann, S.S., Mcchesney, R.W, 1997, p. 155). There is also a large number of groups integrated vertically and horizontally, with a tendency to a multimedia strategy in all the fields of culture and communication, from the world triad of developed countries (USA, Europe and Japan), with some minority presences from other regions of the planet such as Latin America.

The following table summarizes the size of these giants, but also shows how these groups of analogue culture have been adding new agents stemming from the digital networks, in a question that we analyse in several subsequent modules, but anticipate the combination of new and old digital culture power players in what some authors have significantly started to refer to as "HollyWeb", the competition/ alliance between the classic Majors, integrated into huge corporations, with the new large groups born on the Internet.

**THE TOP TEN GLOBAL CULTURE AND COMMUNICATION GROUPS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ranking</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Creation</th>
<th>Turnover (2010) (MD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sony</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>83.844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Walt Disney</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1923</td>
<td>38.063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Comcast</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>37.937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Amazon</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>34.204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>News Corporation</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>32.778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Google</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>29.321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Time Warner</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>26.888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>DirectTV</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>24.102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Maruhan</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>23.805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Bertelsmann</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1835</td>
<td>21.791</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


However, the thing that is most characteristic of the dominant international structure of the last two decades is no longer concentration carried to its maximum historical dimensions, but its corollary: the process of financing of the large companies and groups in the framework of an accelerated commercialization of all culture. With this concept, a series of major mutations of this business architecture is included: from the general step of private and family management to management in the hands of executives not necessarily involved in ownership; a close interweaving with the financial capital by means of recourse to external capital (credits, bonds, IPOs...) driven by a desire for growth and concentration; the consequent demand for high rates of permanent profit, characteristic of the capital market.
But the consequences of these changes in corporate architecture also had profound consequences on cultural products in these sectors. In team research carried out in the first half of this decade, it was concluded that contemporary culture has undergone years of intense, regulatory, economic and social changes, that have accelerated in the last two decades, and are essential to understand trends in digital culture but also in an analogue communication culture that will coexist with the former for a long time (see Bustamante, 2002; 2003).

In this particular case, we can summarize these prior essential changes to "Analogue Culture" in a few lines:

-Traditional forms of culture, such as painting or sculpture, such as theatre or dance, have gradually had to submit to market rules to survive economically, despite the limitations of a specific economic structure marked by the value of the unique original (as was diagnosed by Baumol's disease for the live show). However, the performing and visual arts remain permanently in crisis, with extraordinary examples of concentration and globalization (such as theatrical or musical franchises and Christie’s and Sotheby’s).

As an important testing ground for this intensive commercialization, we have the conspicuous change of the great museums, both private and public, from a traditional conception focused on gathering, conserving and teaching about the great recognised national works of art to centres focusing on audience rates and aimed at merchandising, restoration, the attraction of patrons and benefactors (sponsoring) the purchase and sale of works of art or their international commercial circulation (rent, franchises) which, starting with the private foundations (the Guggenheim model) has already reached the great National Museums (the Louvre in Abu Dhabi); in short, the generalized archetype of the museum-spectacle, theorized and praised during periods of economic growth (Frei, B., 2000) but harshly challenged during the economic crisis, which has come to reveal its huge economic limitations and its deep cultural deficiencies (diffusion model).

-The publishing cultural industries (such as the book, the record or the film) brought out in hard format and subject to payment by the consumer, have shown for years more vitality and pluralism, even with their lower "entry barriers" for the competition, but the process of national and international concentration and growing parallel commercialization have ended up adapting those products to the supreme objective of the highest possible sales too, thus transferring commercial pressure from commercialization and distribution to production and ultimately, to the creation itself.

-Much more apt for this process, the communication streaming media such as the radio, the television or the press have quickly become the centre points of capitalist development itself, adjusting themselves -driven by advertising- to the rule of large audiences, the star system and high profits, and gradually, due to their own market dynamics, getting rid of cultural and educational programmes, but also in general innovative and minority products, for the sake of spectacle and sensationalism: the unstoppable advance of the Infoshow in its very diverse varieties of mixture of reality and fiction, the general conversion of the television news, from its initial conception as a platform for democratic information and privileged connection between administrators and citizens, into a form of info-entertainment (lurid crime reports, celebrity gossip, self-promotion, advertising).

Thus, we would not be attending a single model that is imposed on a global level, an "Americanization" or an overwhelming and dominant MacDonald’s culture, epitomised by selling products that are exactly the same all over the world, but the combination of these strategies (certainly present and strong) with the assimilation of many local creations to domesticate the local repertoires of any country, to "indigenize its production" by subsidiaries to even carry out a decontextualized "globalized reconstruction" of world cinema, of world music, of an international literary style (García Canclini, 1999).
Financialization and cultural contents

But concentration and financialization lead to other "major mutations", such as pressure from high profit rates with the intensive use of marketing and promotion techniques aimed at ensuring the commercial success of its launches to the maximum; Not "to sell what is produced, but to produce what can be sold" (Achille, 1997). Both globally and in the dominant regional or national groups, this means focusing exclusively on the Best or Fast-seller and accelerating its exploitation in an increasingly faster and more saturated rotation, based on their absolute control of distribution. This road to a real "cloning culture", permanently repeating past successful products, cannot fail to punish innovative or minority creations, small and medium-sized enterprises and minority languages and cultures, jeopardizing the whole of ecology historically established by each sector (Bustamante, 2003).

In summary, at the end of the nineteen-nineties, the old analogue model of commercialized and industrialized culture already showed these shortcomings, flaws and pernicious deviations, that were not sustainable, either in terms of satisfying demand (diversity) or in terms of its own economic sustainability. “Digital” culture, with all the discussions that we will see in other units, has at least opened new stages for the future.

A special mention is deserved for the structure of the C.I.s in Latin American countries, and their similarities with the Latin and, above all, Iberian, European countries, in which research has found unique characteristics, beyond the common languages, which mark the whole evolution of contemporary culture:

* In the field of consumption, numerous studies have shown that throughout Latin America, but also in Spain and Portugal, the gaping differences in income and ample historic socio-cultural deficit prioritize the free media (advertising) over those requiring payment (both publishing industries – such as book, record, film – and electronic industries – such as Pay TV–), where acceptation by the public is generally reduced to economic and cultural capital minorities (Mastrini & Becerra, 2006).

- This pervasive hegemony of the audio-visual media (radio and television) is thus becoming blown out of proportion in our countries not only due to this socio-economic and cultural structure, but also to the unusual case, already pointed out by many authors, of audio-visual media leaping forward into modernity from the transmission of traditional culture without the usual transit through written culture (the book and the mass press).

* Together, such traits determine the inescapable diagnosis of a scarce diversity of cultural offerings, both in exchanges and for those who speak or are represented in culture and communication (Sánchez Ruiz, 2006).

- In research into the ten biggest culture and communication groups in Latin America, it was therefore concluded that this oligopoly has moved from its original patriarchal management to a more modern management, without abandoning its historical opportunistic strategy focused on the safest and most profitable markets, which highlights the imbalances of our countries, copying the strategies of the Majors on a smaller scale: abandoning whole segments of the riskiest original creation-production (records, films...) to cultivate only protected local markets (soap operas, local niches), centring on distribution and the mass media (press, radio, television), alliances with global US groups as broadcasting terminals for their products, accelerated financing (stock exchange, bonds) and debt that led to an end result of exclusive strategies for fast-sellers to the detriment of regional cultural diversity... (Bustamante & De Miguel, 2005).

Moreover, its economic base remains anchored in advertising investments, despite its vertical and multimedia diversification.
* In a similar sense, the authors of more recent research concluded that "in Latin America, groups like Televisa, Cisneros, Globo and Clarín dominate the regional market, and their behaviour has a similar logic to that observed by the main corporate actors on a global scale" (Mastrini, G., Becerra, M., 2000).

- A result of this is the weakness of SMEs in the region which, subjected to the double clamp mentioned above, are turned into extreme terminals of a funnel economy in which they assume all the risks of the renewal of talent with little expectation of profit. Furthermore, beyond the business world, there are legions of artists and creators who do not find refuge in the large groups and often not even in small publishers or producers, and who are forced to resort to a direct and informal economy that runs through to the goods and services of the single market in the form of a submerged or black economy (‘shadow’ in the graphic and suggestive Mexican denomination; Stones, 2003), an evaluation of which no one has yet dared to realize but that we know from direct experience is extremely extensive and goes far beyond alleged ‘piracy’.

### Diversity and pluralism versus Economics

The increasing number of concentration processes on an international level and the strong centralization of their parent companies in the richest countries, have provoked theoretical and political reactions since the sixties when faced with the evident inequality of cultural exchanges and domination in almost all segments of the C.I.s. In the end, there is a historical struggle between the idea of Culture and the C.I.s as an identity, as a major element of development versus the unilateral view of culture as an economy.

In their earliest history, these conflicts can be traced back to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948: "Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression, which includes the right (...) to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers." In part, this idea dominated post-war Europe after World War II, when most large western European countries considered that culture and communication should be protected by the State to ensure their harmonious development and universal access (culture ministries or councils, public radio and television, linked to free public education).

On an international level, these demands had to wait twenty years until their awakening within the new decolonized nations, and their relative incorporation into what was then known as the movement of Non-Aligned Countries (in relation to the Cold War between the West and the Soviet Union). With increasing influence in the UN and UNESCO, this movement coincided with the institutionalization of the concept of the culture industries, pitting the legitimacy of national public actions in defence of stable culture and communication against the permanent slogan of "Free flow" maintained by the United States, as a concurrent paradigm with the simple game of commercial trade.

The milestones of this movement, of great political repercussion at the time, would take up a lot of space, but they can be summarized in some iconic dates and events:


- 1982, Mexico: Conference and Declaration on Cultural Policies (See: Various authors, 1982).
In this tight timeline, the theoretical culmination of the movement in the so-called MacBride report, entitled "A single world, multiple voices", the result of an international commission of fifteen members "on the problems of communication", should be highlighted. It was led by the Nobel Peace Prize winner, Sean MacBride (and included prominent Latin American figures such as García Márquez and Juan Somavia), who advocated a "fairer and more efficient international order" in communication, but also in culture (MacBride, S. 1980).

The report, which already contemplated the incipient technological changes of convergence between telecommunications, computing and social culture-communication, noted the inequalities existing in production capacity and in the flow of communication and cultural products on an international level (audio-visual fiction, agency news...) and it came to the conclusion of the legitimacy of nation states to build public communication policies that protect their communicative and cultural autonomy and to cooperate with other nations in the construction of the NWICO (New World Information and Communication Order), which would be integrated as a major part of the NIEO (New International Economic Order).

Indeed, the culmination of this movement was also its swan song, because the pressure and withdrawal of the United States (with Ronald Reagan) and the United Kingdom (with Margaret Thatcher) from the UNESCO but also the virulent reaction of the large Western communication groups against the report, which was accused of being communist and manipulated by the Soviet Union, managed to eliminate this problem from the agenda of the international organization for over twenty years, until the 2000s. The departure of the President of UNESCO, Amadou Mahtar M’Bou, meant that these claims would be forgotten until the debates that resulted in the Convention for Diversity in 2005.

In that long interim period, the global confrontation in Culture moved to the international trade forums, exploding in the so-called Uruguay Round (between 1986 and 1993) of GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, in existence since 1945): in the negotiations on free trade agreements and the attempt to impose on audio-visual arts and culture, the general clauses on non-discrimination and regulatory disarmament, which in practice prohibit state or regional policies that support their own culture, Europe, led by France, failed to permanently exclude these activities from the agreements but achieved at least a ten-year exemption, which was known as the "cultural exception."

This provisional solution has meant that, periodically, in every negotiation or advance of the WTO (World Trade Organization, established in 1995), the debate on culture and its total liberalization is reopened, especially under the GATS, the treaty on free trade in services, including culture. In its latest version, from as recently as 2013, and on the occasion of the negotiations of a free trade agreement between the USA and the E.U., the European stand-off on the subject led the secretary General of the E.U., José Manuel Duran Barroso, to accuse France, which was still insisting that culture was not just one more commodity, of adopting a "totally reactionary" stance, while the filmmaker Costa Gavras, at the forefront of a wide movement of artists, described Barroso as "a very dangerous man for culture".

Over recent years, this sustained tension has developed in parallel with the revival of the problem of symbolic imbalances within the UNESCO, but now focuses much more on culture than on communication.

A movement, supported by many countries in the face of bilateral or multilateral free trade treaties, which would culminate in the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, adopted at the 33rd Conference of the Organization, in Paris, on 20th October 2005, and which has already been ratified or agreed to by 118 countries, among them Spain (BOE 12-2-2007).

-Cultural diversity: "refers to the multiplicity of ways in which the cultures of groups and societies are expressed"

-Cultural diversity is "a defining characteristic of humanity", a "common heritage of humanity".

-Cultural Activities, Goods and Services "have both an economic and a cultural nature, because they convey identities, values and meanings, and must therefore not be treated as solely having commercial value".

-Sovereign right of States to "formulate and implement their cultural policies".

-Policies and measures of the Parties (the signatory States) must be "consistent with this Convention".

-Need to "incorporate culture as a strategic element of national and international development policies."

-Including the participation of non-profit organizations, civil society, the public cultural service, the public broadcasting service.

-Need for international cooperation to achieve maximum cultural diversity.

The concept of diversity thus came to replace the cultural exception with a less defensive and more positive and proactive nuance. But in its recent and short journey, this idea of the solidarity of diversity has already been the subject of multiple debates and misrepresentations, including the argument of various senior business executives who insist that diversity is already guaranteed by the market and the various autonomous divisions of their own multimedia groups. However, as noted in the conclusions of a collective text: "Diversity is not limited to the number of products on the market; it goes further by dividing the differentiated offer into the following three types of diversity: territorial entities (countries and collectives, large, medium and small; business operators (large, medium and small) and institutional models (pure market, public service, third sector or non-profit companies "(Yúdice, G., 2002).

In the same vein, one of the greatest current culture economists, David Throsby, points out that it is important to remember (...) "that the goods and services generated by the Cultural Industries are distinguished from other goods and services by the fact that they produce a cultural value in addition to an economic one, and that this cultural value is in itself important to society. An industrial development strategy, for example, that insisted only on the creation of economic value by the C.I.s would be incomplete" (Throsby, 2011, p. 180).

Cultural Cooperation and Diversity

Martín Barbero points out that cultural cooperation shows a new side to the edges of diversity: "The practice of interculturality, that is, a relationship between cultures that is no longer unidirectional and paternalistic, but interactive and reciprocal, because instead of seeking to influence the others, each culture accepts that cooperation is a transforming action both for the culture requesting it and that responding, and for all the other cultures that will be involved in the collaboration process"(Martín Barbero, J., 2006).
From the Entertainment and Leisure Industries to the Creative Industries

In the American academic and professional tradition, there is seldom talk of Cultural Industries, but of the Entertainment Industry, where a pragmatic vision of the industry as a business, as an economy, reigns. The headline of this type of approach is that of Harold Vogel, former consultant at Merrill Lynch, presented as "A guide for financial analysis", which has led to numerous consultancy studies on the North American or international market (see Vogel, H., 1994).

Entertainment and Leisure

Entertainment is defined as "the action of entertaining, amusing, or causing someone to have a nice time; something that entertains, amuses or well-occupies the attention pleasantly" (Vogel, H., 1994). The industries are: "A design, art, business or manufacturing department: a productive or profitable division of labour; especially one that employs extensive personal and capital, "and are oriented towards leisure time, as opposed to work. They consist of the activities of classical culture and cultural industries, but include many others: cinema, music, radio-television (Broadcasting), advertising, editing and new media, toys and games and lotteries and casinos (gambling and betting), sports, orchestras and dance and operas (Performing Arts and culture) plus amusement parks. All together, they confirm a trend for much greater growth than the rest of the economy.

The problem with this type of definitions and studies is not only that they forget the political and social face of culture, and therefore the permanent influence of the public authorities on it. In its efforts to exaggerate the economic weight of these sectors, it mixes cultural activities with others that are not cultural at all, forgetting the economic uniqueness of culture, which is added to many other non-cultural economic activities.

Since the second half of the 90s and especially in the 21st century, the term "creative industries" has been used more and more, and many other forms often stem from it: creative economy, creative companies, creative workers, creative countries. The origin of the concept dates back to the Australian Labour Party of the early 90s, but its success is linked to the "Third Way" of Tony Blair’s Labour Party in the United Kingdom. A Creative Task Force was launched (1997-2000), along with many other initiatives, such as the report All Our futures: Creativity, Culture & Education (September 1999) and two successive editions of a Creative Mapping Document (1998-2000), a sustained campaign that promptly replaced the well-worn Information Society slogan of Thatcherism for the Cultural Economy, rapidly complemented by the creative base.

Creative Industries

"Activities that have their origin in individual creativity, skill and talent, and that have potential for job creation and work through the generation and exploitation of intellectual property" (Braun, E./Lavanga, M., 2007).

The objective was always to "maximize the economic impact of British creative industries in and out of the UK" (Cox Report, CIT in Schlesinger, 2008), involving in that task the Treasury, Trade and Industry Ministry departments, as well as those of Culture (Culture, Media & Sports) and Education. In early analyses, the sectors involved included advertising, architecture, art and antiques, design, fashion, film and interactive programmes, music, performance arts, editing, software, television and radio, but also, on occasion, consumer electronics, computer science and telecommunications, mass sports.... The problem, like in the entertainment industries, lies in the blurred and frequently changing borders of this denomination, so that the studies and statistics of each area or each report often change the sectors of activity analysed, preventing comparisons between regions and countries or changes over time.
From the United Kingdom, the attention paid to the Creative Industries spread rapidly throughout Europe and reached the E.U. authorities with its study on "The Economy of Culture in Europe" (KEA, 2006), later presented as a key part of the Lisbon Summit of 2000 and its 2010 strategy, being formally adopted by the European Council when it proclaimed the need for a map of the sector and a study on "The paths in which creativity, creative industries and the public and private partners in the cultural sector contribute to the European economy, to the social and cultural potential and thus, to meeting the Lisbon objectives "(E.U., 2006: P. 2). And it attained global significance when UNCTAD, the UN development agency, sponsored the idea in its "Creative Economy." Report "(UNCTAD, 2008).

Although this report and certain authors have simply identified the Cultural Industries and Creative Industries, some texts, such as that of KEA for the E.U., have been more reasonably and usefully specific, distinguishing in the latest report on the Economy of Culture in Europe between:

- The Cultural Sector: "Producer of non-reproducible goods and services aimed at being "consumed" on the ground"

- Industrial Sectors: "Producer of cultural goods aimed at mass reproduction, mass dissemination and export"; specifying later that they are "entirely cultural", without secondary utilitarian functions. 

- and the "Creative Sector": "Where culture becomes a creative input in the production of non-cultural goods "; or "Creativity": "the use of cultural resources as an intermediary in the consumption and production processes in non-cultural sectors and thus as a source of innovation".

Graphically, this typology is shown in the afore-mentioned report as a set of three concentric circles: in the first would be the Arts Field (painting, sculpture, design, photography, art and antiques), and the Performing Arts (opera, theatre, dance, circus) and heritage, libraries, archives. The second includes the book, the film, the record, the radio, the television, the press.). The third, that of creativity, is recognized as being more ambiguous and undefined (with activities "impossible to delimit") and without international indicators to measure it, but design, architecture and advertising are tentatively included here.
### Table 1.1.2. Proposal for an outline of the cultural and creative sectors (Source: KEA, 2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CIRCLES</th>
<th>SECTORS</th>
<th>SUB-SECTORS</th>
<th>CHARACTERISTICS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CORE ARTS FIELD</td>
<td>Visual arts</td>
<td>Crafts - Paintings - Sculpture - Photography</td>
<td>• Non-industrial activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performing arts</td>
<td>Theatre - Dance - Circus - Festivals</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Output are prototypes and “potentially copyrighted works” i.e., these works have a high density of creation that would be eligible to copyright but they are however not systematically copyrighted, as it is the case for most craft works, some performing arts productions and visual arts, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heritage</td>
<td>Museums - Libraries - Archaeological sites - Archives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIRCLE 1: CULTURAL INDUSTRIES</td>
<td>Film and Video</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Industrial activities aimed at massive reproduction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV and radio</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Outputs are based on copyright.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Video games</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Music</td>
<td>Recorded music market - Live music performances - Revenues of collecting societies in the music sector</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Books and press</td>
<td>Book publishing - Magazine and press publishing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIRCLE 2: CREATIVE INDUSTRIES AND ACTIVITIES</td>
<td>Design</td>
<td>Fashion design - graphic design - interior design - product design</td>
<td>• Activities are not necessarily industrial, and may be prototypes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Architecture</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Although outputs are based on copyright, they may include other intellectual property inputs (trademark for instance).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advertising</td>
<td></td>
<td>• The use of creativity, innovative skills and creative people originating in the arts field and in the field of cultural industries is essential to the performances of these non-culture sectors.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIRCLE 3: RELATED INDUSTRIES</td>
<td>PC manufacturers, MP3 player manufacturers, mobile industry, etc...</td>
<td></td>
<td>• This category is loose and impossible to circumscribe on the basis of clear criteria. It involves many other economic sectors that are dependent on the previous &quot;artless&quot; such as the ICT sector.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

: "the cultural sector" : "the creative sector"

The caution of the documents of the Commission or of the reports carried out for it by the consultancy company KEA, as they avoid the usual elephantiasis of the ICR, certainly deserves attention. By only including in that perimeter advertising and design (since creative architecture could be included within the latter), clearly differentiating them from culture and the Cultural Industries, the EU seems to be drawing attention to the growing strategic importance of culture as a tool to revitalize the non-cultural sectors and activities by two means that have received insufficient attention in academic research, at least in terms of their economic and social weight, their development conditions and their European structures. What is surprising in this context is
that the EU has not made or commissioned specific empirical reports on the reality of these sectors in Europe, which would be the base for specific support measures or programmes for the future.

Faced with reports like the afore-mentioned 2009 KEA report, the heuristic and ethereal character of which, appealing to the irrational and the sentimental, without any field work, would never be approved as a doctoral thesis in any European university, it does not seem so complicated to carry out an authentic empirical study on advertising and design, analysing their real economic weight, improving their analysis according to activities and separating their cultural, informative components and those of the corresponding generation of added value from the purely industrial ones.

For this particular analysis, we would have to start from the close links that have been maintained and that increase with culture, a field that many authors have already developed in advertising and design, and that no one could deny today. It has been many years now since emblematic exhibitions were held, such as that of the Pompidou Centre in Paris (1992) on advertising and the avant-garde, or that of the MOMA in New York ("Design and the Elastic Mind", 2008) on the indissoluble relationships between art and design, a topic many authors have reflected on in recent times.

This does not by any means mean that both sectors can be included in the Cultural Industries, as we have previously argued (see Bustamante, 2011). Firstly, because unlike those sectors that are not dedicated exclusively to the creation and transmission of symbolic values, they are permanently subordinated to other pragmatic commercial objectives (the sale of a brand, a product or service) and limited in their creative possibilities by the utilitarian value (symbolized by the briefing), as the KEA analyses themselves indicate.

Furthermore, to consider advertising as a "total cultural industry" (Rodriguez, 2010) or a "cross-cultural industry", as some studies have proposed, would mean to bring the C.I.s back to their abusive singular version, confusing very diverse activities, and once more unifying dynamics between sectors (subject matter, reproduction devices, demands and specific uses) that research fruitfully learnt to distinguish between decades ago.

Neither Advertising nor Design, in generic terms, fulfils the basic conditions of autonomy that mark the singularity of each branch of the C.I.s, from their original technological innovation adapted to the reproduction of symbolic prototypes, to the conformation of an independent demand and business model, as much as they may interact with each other and have common trends. Even if Advertising is also a massive producer of symbolic content specific to the various media and formats (press, radio, television or, now, the Internet) and even reaches a minority status of autonomy in its Internet brand channels, without parasitizing other non-commercial content.

On the other hand, it would be absurd to deny the enormous modern economic importance of Advertising and Design, far greater than that of many Cultural Industries. The first, as an essential means of financing for the mass media and even, increasingly, of almost all digital cultural content; Design, for its contribution of added value to countless economic activities of our time.

But precisely this economic omnipresence requires us to be exquisitely careful in the method of evaluating its importance in the economy: for example, differentiating within Advertising between its different formats and activities, especially taking note of the role of advertising creativity, trying not to fall into the double book-keeping of resources already counted in the mass media, separating for example interpersonal communication (such as telemarketing); and in the case of design, with activities in common with the former (for example, in graphic design), it would be necessary to measure exclusively the value it adds to the industrial and mercantile processes, differentiating them strictly from the latter, and avoiding all erroneous exaggeration of its weight in GDP.

Observatorio Cultural del Proyecto Atalaya
Above all, rather than its macroeconomic magnitudes, it would be important to study its functioning, breeding ground, structures, agents, relationships between creators and practical restrictions, its development or delay in each European country, its external dependencies, its resulting strengths and weaknesses in Europe. As an example, while in the European debate CRIs are confused with SMEs and small entrepreneurs, we know well that nowadays advertising is concentrated in huge global mega-groups, most of which have few autonomous business roots in Europe; and that design, contrary to its reputation, also appears more and more as a priority area for the multinationals and for large innovation departments. To calculate the European trade deficit in these branches -as has been done in cinema and television - and consequently the profits and employment "exported" to other countries - would not be a futile exercise in this context, but a realistic base and another important tool for drawing up action plans.

**Economy of Culture figures**

Europe: According to the 2006 KEA report, the economy of culture and creativity in the E.U. in 2003 amassed a turnover of 654 billion euros, i.e. 2.6% of GDP, but also in the previous five-year period, showed very high growth rates of 19.7% in total, in the year cited accumulating as many as 5.8 million jobs (3.1% of the EU total) (KEA, 2006). The Economy of Culture in Europe.

Spain: According to the Satellite Account on Culture in Spain (SACS, so-called because they are provided for by the National Accounts of Spain or NASs), in 2009 cultural activities contributed a total of 29,753 ME to the GDP (with a growth of 4% per annum from 2000 to 2009), that is to say, that they made up 2.8% of the total Spanish GDP in 2009. It was reported however that in these activities, the MC had already counted the value of reproduction devices and auxiliary industries which veers away from the strict concept of value of the symbolic activities.

The Ministry of Culture statistics usually include, separately and collectively, the evaluation of intellectual property activities (specifying that they also refer to computer science and advertising which, they warn, "in principle, should not be considered strictly cultural" (...) but the knowledge of which is essential in order to understand the creative sector as a whole". So, adding these activities to the strictly cultural, the SACS estimated a contribution to the GDP of 37,775 ME in 2009 (with an average growth of 4% per annum since 2000), i.e. 3.6% of the total GDP. Although computer science has only been included in "creative" activities in a few international studies of very lax definition, according to the SACS, all of these activities together add up to a percentage of GDP higher than the energy industry and even than traditional sectors such as agriculture, livestock and fishing. And this global vision is completed by pointing out the number of Spanish companies engaged in these activities: 102,945 (2009) and total employment: 544,800 people (idem). (cit. en Flichy, P., 1995. p. 33).

**Cultural and communication policies**

Debates on these concepts and their nuances are not confined only to the academic or theoretical field, but have strong practical consequences:

The evolution of the Cultural Industries during their already relatively long history is directly linked to the actions of the State since their beginnings. Censorship and control, their gradual opening up to private business (as in the press or, later, in radio and television), the direct management of some of them, the purchase of cultural products as a major client, their tax treatment (the "cultural" VAT, so much discussed in these times, for example), etc., make this this fact evident. However, in modern terms, these actions have been included within the names, often unfortunately separated in their analysis, of Cultural Policies and Communication Policies.
In reality, the conceptualization and development of both of these have been running in parallel in recent history. And until the seventies and even the eighties both were thought of as total and coherent entities: "Set of explicit, consistent and lasting measures that are aimed at..." (Bustamante, 1985). The frustrations and disappointments of that time have helped to make analyses and definitions more modest and to draw attention not only to the central State, but also to its regional and local echelons; at the same time, these public policies, which would also include those carried out from civil society (associations of all kinds, third sector), have been differentiated from the private policies undoubtedly exercised by the large C.I. business groups. Sticking to public policies for now (but not only the national ones) we could establish cultural and communication policies, in a broad and pragmatic sense, as "the actions and omissions of State organizations of all kinds which, according to the ideas and legitimations of each society and each moment of history, determine or orient the destinies of the creation, production, dissemination and consumption of cultural and communication products. The systematic use of the plural also points to this broad and flexible understanding that does not require a unifying and coherent plan a priori.

Many authors have been following the history of these policies for centuries and have always found cultural and communication actions made from positions of power (such as the patronage of kings, nobles, popes and cardinals), because talking about society necessarily implies talking about culture and communication and about their relationships with politics. However, reflecting on this history does not cease to be a uchronia, in the sense that we are considering from our modern perspective, events that have nothing to do with current circumstances and ideas, and that go back to times before the conformation of the Nation-States and modern culture.

In its modern sense, the concept itself is in effect born after the Second World War, inserted into what has been called the Welfare State, that is to say within Keynesian practices on the economy and society. The Welfare State or Providence State, in addition to a systematic intervention to orientate the market, did not actually only protect the population from the contingencies of health, old age or unemployment, but was also an active presence in cultural fields such as education, culture and the media, (including equal access to communication networks, railways, telecommunications, the post office, etc.) without which the founding myth of democracy, equality of opportunities - even theoretical - was meaningless (Calabrese/Burgelmann, 1999). These objectives are inevitably not exempt from the objectives of action on industrial structures: audio-visual policies, for example, initially aimed at protectionism with regard to the external threat (US) were later directed more clearly, without entirely abandoning this end, towards the protection of the sector from itself, from its imbalances and its spontaneous market trends, to ensure its harmonious re-production (between the cinema and the television, between production and broadcasting, ...). But even in this economic derivation, principles of social welfare could be claimed, such as the citizen's right to choose, the maintenance of cultural identity, etc.

With this background, an analysis of the typologies themselves regarding cultural and communication policies, clearly shows their notable changes over time.

**Ideological perspectives:**

- From a liberal point of view, state intervention in these fields was in response to the mistakes of normal market dynamics in the field of public assets, of the natural monopoly or of activities like education whose benefits for social reproduction were only visible in the medium-long term. The sought-after state subsidising of the market was at the root of these approaches, which fits with the promotion of private patronage based on large companies and foundations.
-for social democratic thinking, cultural policies (and education or communication policies too) fulfilled a broader and more autonomous role, that of ensuring equality of initial conditions for all citizens as a basis for competition and democratic participation, which the market could never guarantee by its own logic.

Although these options still generally distinguish between the neoliberal and right-wing programmes of the Social Democrats or the Left in general, it seems clear that the sharpness of borders between the two perspectives is far from being absolute today, and that the programmes of many socialist parties have increasingly been coloured by economic and even economistic criteria (forgetting the social side of culture). This has meant a change, in the words of the American cultural anthropologist Georg Yúdice, from the view of culture as a right (universal access to a diverse and high-quality culture) to the increasingly dominant view of culture as an economic resource (for profits, growth and employment) (Yúdice, G., 2002).

**Role of the State:**

By one means or another, a series of actions were rolled out in Europe, but also in the United States and many other countries of advanced or intermediate development, that can be grouped into three major roles of the State:

* The State as a manager of the production and dissemination of cultural and communication products, in a monopoly (radio and television for example) or in competition.

* The State as an instigator of market or civil society activities, not only with direct and indirect financial aid, but also in its outstanding role in the creation of social representation (Lacroix/Tremblay/Miège, 1994) which contributes to the generation of demand.

* The State as a regulator or arbitrator to directly or, increasingly, indirectly, establish the performance standards for social agents, via autonomous authorities in each field.

But, although States have generally tended to slip from the direct management and production of services to their instigation and, above all, to external regulation as "arbitrators", most countries are now characterized by different combinations of these roles, in differing proportions according to the background, mentality and resistances of each country.

In parallel with this typology, other interesting classifications of cultural policies have been made, the greater or lesser application of which today shows the size and the importance of these changes:

**State cultural structures:**

Depending on the state agency responsible for these policies, the French model, centred on agencies specializing in culture and communication (the Ministry of Culture especially, formally created in 1959 by André Malraux) has been repeatedly differentiated (Bonnet, Dueñas, Portel, 1992; Benhamou, 1996) from the Anglo-Saxon model, where notable differences can actually be seen between the British case, marked by an elitist conception of the "arts" and organized with strong public financing but by independent bodies (the "quangos"), and the American case, that did not take off until the sixties (with the National Endowment for the Arts and Humanities, or NEA), and quickly settles on a central axis: the incitement to private investment and capital (patronage) through tax deductions. However, although these initial models are largely still in place in these founding countries, in recent years most States have practiced diverse mixtures of State and private initiative, with a trend certainly towards a more prominent role being played by private companies and foundations,
where increasingly the dynamics lead the strategies and objectives with their radical extreme in the American case.

Furthermore, in relation to the general structure of the States we can distinguish between:

-Centralized politics: in the State capital, as has traditionally been the case of France but also of the United Kingdom.

-Decentralized politics: in federal countries like Germany, in the first place, but also in the USA and even, because of their distribution of public budgets, in Spain, where the Autonomous Communities and the large municipalities bear the weight of 82-85% of State expenditure on Culture.

Communicative models of cultural policy

Another classical typology is that based on the cultural and communicative model implicit in cultural policy (Vidal Beneyto, 1981; Zallo, 1995), and has been marked since the fifties by a passive vision of the cultural "democratization" according to which the diffusion of the most sublime creations was enough to ensure the cultural elevation of the whole of the population; since the seventies, especially in France, a more active philosophy of "cultural democracy" appeared, in which policies are based on the participation of citizens in the creation and reception of culture as the only way of them fully grasping and assimilating it (in line with an active receiver theory). However, if we analyse the officially formulated principles and objectives of cultural policies in developed countries, we see that both conceptions still coexist, and are even mixed up in barely coherent combinations to legitimize and guide public actions.

Cultural policies or industrial policies:

Finally, it is interesting to note the attention paid by some experts to the concrete echelons of each cultural sector on which state action is primarily exerted, although the joint aims remain the preservation of cultural identity or the balanced reproduction of the system. Thus, in a study carried out on cultural policies in 13 countries belonging to the Council of Europe, it was discovered that the "centre of gravity" of this intervention was the production stage, while it was little practiced in the promotion or transmission of these products (Rouet,1989).

It is, however, easy to notice, over the last decade especially, that national and regional policies have been increasingly oriented towards distribution, promotion and sales, in parallel with the clear hegemony of the "valley" in the cultural and communication sectors and that in production itself the "objective" criteria of sales have been prioritised, also in line with the dominant philosophy of prioritizing success endorsed by the market. In return, grants to creators (debuts, innovative works, emerging producers...) and consumers have been marginalized.

This prioritizing of market success in the awarding of state aid evidently pays more tribute to industrial policy than cultural policy whose basic aim – to support creativity and pluralism, to compensate for market failures – is undermined to a large extent.

But the footprints of public policy objectives can also often be followed in the tools put in place to develop them: outright government grants often characterize cultural policy, while financial guarantees or repayable loans are more typical of policies of a clear economic nature.
Contradictions of deregulation:

Running through all the typologies, since the seventies and eighties we have been dealing with a transformation process linked to the fiscal and ideological crisis of the welfare state, which, in culture and communication, is projected onto multiple criticisms of state intervention (bureaucratization and inefficiency, state control, interference with free competition...), but the scope of which goes much further.

On the one hand, each of the roles of the State and its forms (monopoly or competition, direct or indirect actions, state-owned or mediated by independent bodies, ...) as well as their relative weights and interrelationships have evolved in each society, showing relatively common trends while still having their national peculiarities. This is symbolically shown by the general deterioration of the concept and practice of public service in culture and communication, based on the universality of service and tariff adequacy or cross subsidy (rich markets subsidize poor markets, just as in telecommunications or the postal service, or television), and subjected to direct and monopolistic management in Western Europe or the oligopoly of licenses on the basis of "public utility" in the United States (Tremblay, 1988); because both models have led in parallel to the ambiguous concept of "universal service", dominated more by the idea of accessibility and connectability of the networks than by actually being within reach of the users. In any case, and generally speaking, state intervention has been losing weight as an operator or direct manager (always now submitted to public-private competition like in broadcasting), with a tendency to emphasize its arbitral role and even to reduce its role as a development tool.

With the commercial expansion of the cultural industries, we have also seen how States have exacerbated the contradictions between "conservationist" policies, linked to the classical cultural sectors and commercial competition leaving the cultural industries with the greatest social impact to their fate. In other words, the state took responsibility for the past while leaving the future to the market (Martin Barbero, 2002). In the field of the cultural industries themselves, paradoxes were highlighted of a peculiar social legitimation that protected some sectors of somewhat highbrow culture (like the cinema) while leaving others (records always, books at times), to the fate of the market, or that considered some segments of culture as belonging to the public sphere protected from commercial pressure while abandoning the fate of the written press, radio and television to the process of private concentration. Out-of-date, archaic conceptions often, in the face of great changes within the C.I.s that have prevented many countries, for example, from responding to the challenge of integration between sectors, especially in the audio-visual sector (filière), generally protecting the cinema but ignoring the role of the feature film, or the weakness of audio-visual production in general, in videos or on the television (Bustamante, 1994).

The "communication" state and the market battering ram

Even in the symbolic French case, a common example of a systematic and exhaustive cultural policy, its inconsistencies in supporting each sector have been highlighted (Rouet, 1997), its inefficiencies on explicit objectives (such as the putting the brakes on the concentration of the press (Floc/Somme, 2000), and even, since the end of the eighties, the replacement of the Cultural State with the "Communication State", where great communication operations (magnificent centenaries, great music, cinema or book fairs) are aimed at, rather than promoting the diffusion of culture, to masking a growing depletion of resources and incoherence in the objectives of the cultural project or its absence (Graziani, 2000).

But these "showcase politics" conclusions can, with many more reasons and empirical evidence, look to the cultural policy of other countries (the competition for universal exhibitions or the Olympics, or for "European Capitals of Culture") especially in those societies with less tradition of cultural policies such as Spain, where the great celebrations of the Socialist governments (the centenary of the "discovery" of America, new technology trade fairs, or international fairs) have been followed by the Royal Centenaries...
of the right-wing governments (from Felipe II to Carlos I, and to the Catholic monarchs) as instruments for an invented re-edited version of history and national identity. In the same way, in recent times, the wave of building great museums or "cities" of science, image, art..., does not seem to be as much in the interest of addressing the lack of artistic or cultural infrastructures as to fuelling the fierce competition between the "brands" of cities and regions, often forgetting the "cultural contents" necessary for these places to have any appeal.

Moreover, the actions of the State, with fewer and fewer resources destined for these purposes, tend to pave the way for the commercialization of culture, and are even influenced by market dynamics in their own direct actions, by means of the rationalization of costs and profitability (Zallo, 1995). In addition, with the increase of the economic importance of these sectors and their leading role in the generation of employment, many cultural and communication policy actions start to look more like industrial policy, and even become exclusively industrial policy, leaving aside the promotion of creativity and innovation, which are not profitable in the short term.

The strange thing is that this whole process of change has occurred in parallel to the emergence of cultural development and policies on the international agenda, marked by large international meetings and repeated statements urging governments to adopt measures "to fight for the democratization of culture by means or policies that guarantee the right to culture and ensure the unrestricted participation of society in its benefits" (Mohammadi, 1997).

In conclusion, the last years of the 20th Century have seen, in all countries and at an international level, a pronounced disorientation of cultural and communication policies which, without ruling out partisan or politically motivated deviations, carry out confusing and changeable blends of cultural and communication objectives from the past with economic and industrial policies. A triple dynamic in many cases that raises counter-productive consequences from every perspective, demonstrating the increasing difficulties of the State to understand and manage the complex relationships established in the modern world between culture, economy and democracy. A process of ambiguities and contradictions that is not totally foreign to economic globalization and its political projections on the field of culture, and which can likewise look to the policies launched in that sense by regional integration bodies as can be seen from the European Union’s policies on the Information Society since 1994 (Bustamante, 1999).

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IDEAS,
CULTURE
IN
THE
21ST
CENTURY

10. The cultural and creative industries


